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Abstract 
Minorities have gained more civil rights with the cooperation of both major political parties in 
the United States, yet the actions of the Republican Party are often conflated with racism.  This is 
partially the result of clashes in ideological visions, which explain the different political positions 
of partisans.  However, during his 1980 run for the White House, a concerted effort was made to 
tie Ronald Reagan to racism, as he was accused of pandering to white Southerners.  Therefore, 
this thesis also focuses on “Southern strategies” used by both the Republican and Democratic 
parties to exploit race, which have spilled into the new millennium.  
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INTRODUCTION: RACE AND POLITICS 
 
I.  Statement of Purpose 
     In 2008, Senator Barack Obama became the first African American to win the office of 
President of the United States.  If one is to believe polling data, despite a hard fought election, 
the majority of people in the country, including many conservatives, felt optimistic about the 
new leader’s centrist vision.1  This does not mean that President Obama would not encounter 
strident—or even immediate—opposition to his political agenda from the Republican Party or 
that the National Review would start publishing columns singing his praises.  It does mean that 
long after he famously rejected crass factionalism in the 2004 convention speech that launched 
him onto the national stage, many Americans who had not supported Barack Obama at the ballot 
box expressed a sense of good will for the charismatic commander-in-chief and a sense of real 
hope that his vision of unity would prove to be about something more than party rhetoric.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Jeffery M. Jones, “Obama’s Initial Approval Ratings in Historical Context,” Gallup, Janurary 26, 2009, accessed 
February 21, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/113968/obama-initial-approval-ratings-historical context.aspx “At 
the outset of his presidency, Obama has majority approval from all ideological groups, including 83% of self-
identified liberals, 75% of moderates, and 52% of conservatives.” Registering much lower opposition from the 
opposing party than either George W. Bush or Bill Clinton had enjoyed at the exact same point, “Republicans are 
more likely to approve than disapprove of Obama’s performance thus far, according to an average of the first four 
days of Gallup tracking on Obama job approval.” 
Frank Newport, “Obama Wins 83% Approval Rating for Transition,” Gallup, January 19, 2009, accessed March 29, 
2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/113824/obama-wins-83-approval-rating-transition.aspx   
Obama had an “extraordinarily high 78% favorable rating” in January 2008, which suggests a great deal of good will 
from the general electorate at the start of his presidency.  (George W. Bush’s favorable rating running up to his first 
inauguration was only 62% in January 2001.)  Obama enjoyed an 83% approval rating after he named his new team.  
Paul Steinhauser, “Poll: America’s Honeymoon with Obama Continues,” CNN.com, last modified December 24, 
2008, accessed January 19, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/12/24/obama.approval/ 
CNN polling director Keating Holland noted Obama “having a better honeymoon with the American public than any 
incoming president in the past three decades” including Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan.  Obama “can give away 20 
or 30 points and still have a majority of the country on his side.”  
The Economist, “Getting back on Track: Barack Obama is poised to become president, bolstered by enormous 
public good will,” January 19, 2009.  With “stratospheric” poll numbers, “Mr. Obama has repositioned himself as a 
centrist by appointing a team that even a majority of John McCain voters appear quite comfortable with.” 2	  Barrack Obama, “Transcript: Illinois Senate Candidate Barack Obama,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2004.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19751-2004Jul27.html “There’s not a black America and white 
America and Latino America and Asian America: there’s the United States of America.” 
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     Ultimately—and probably inevitably—the hyper enthusiasm associated with a historic 
inauguration cooled as the president got on with the business of governing and pushed through 
sweeping legislation with little to no bipartisan consensus.3  The emergence of a fiscally 
conservative Tea Party in 2009—and certainly the special election of Tea Party endorsed 
candidate Scott Brown to replace Senator Ted Kennedy—portended good fortune for 
Republicans in the 2010 midterms.4   Sweeping turnover in the House demonstrated serious 
pushback against the president’s policies.  Despite the existence of principled disagreement over 
items of political contention such as government spending on an expansive healthcare program, 
many Democrats and their surrogates linked this pushback to racism.5 
     Indeed, by the end of his first term, President Obama seemed to be in a precarious political 
position with white voters.  Per low approval numbers, he had shed millions of former 
supporters.  He would win reelection in 2012 with fewer electoral and popular votes than he had 
secured in 2008.6  The key to his success was retaining every minority group in the Obama 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Deborah Atwater, “Senator Barack Obama: The Rhetoric of Hope and the American Dream,” Journal of Black 
Studies, 38, no. 2 (Nov. 2007): 123.  The substance of Obama’s words had the power to reach across all 
demographics to get Americans to “believe that we are more alike than we are different with a common destiny and 
a core set of values….” 
3 James E. Campbell, “The Seats in Trouble Forecast of the 2010 Elections to the U.S. House,” PS: Political 
Science and Politics, 43, no. 4 (Oct 2010): 627.  Opposition was “relegated to the sidelines” by a “very liberal 
president and congress.” 
4 Bart Stupak, “What Democrats Should Do Now: How Should the White House Respond to Republican Scott 
Brown’s Victory in the Bay State?” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2010.  “People across the country are 
frustrated and feel as though their voices are being ignored in the legislative process.  That’s the lesson all elected 
officials must derive from the Senate race in Massachusetts.”     
5 Jennifer Epstein, “Jim Moran: Racism fueled Democrats’ midterm losses,” Politico, January 27, 2011.  Accessed 
January 21, 2014.  http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48315.html Congressman Jim Moran (D-VA) said 
Democrats lost midterm seats because many voters “don’t want to be governed by an African American.” 
Joan Walsh, “Too Much Tea Party Racism,” Salon, March 20, 2010, accessed January 11, 2014, 
http://www.salon.com/2010/03/20/tea_party_racism/.  The Tea Party movement, closely linked to the Republican 
Party, is “disturbingly racist and reactionary.” 
Kate Zernike, “N.A.A.C.P. Examines Race in the Tea Party Movement,” The New York Times, October 20, 2010, 
accessed January 11, 2014, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/naacp-releases-report-on-tea-party/?_r=0 
On behalf of the N.A.A.C.P., weeks before the 2010 midterms, Leonard Ziskind links Tea Party groups supporting 
Republican candidates to white supremacists.	  
6 Politico, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/map/#/President/2012/  
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coalition—in attracting new Hispanic voters to the polls—by decisively large margins.7 In fifty-
nine predominantly black voting districts in Philadelphia, not a single vote was cast for the 
president’s Republican opponent Mitt Romney.  Nationally, ninety three percent of African 
American voters pulled the lever for the incumbent.8    
     Such massive consolidation of minority votes behind President Obama and the Democratic 
Party invites the question “why.” There has been no shortage of opinion offered by pundits.  
Many feel the Party of Lincoln projects an image of racial exclusivity with limited appeal to non-
white voters.9  Additionally, the individual liberty ethos that drives Republican free market 
ideology has at times clashed with the special interests of liberally minded, minority out-
groups.10  For those who have felt crushed under the weight of racial bias, a “pull yourself up by 
your own bootstraps” mentality to improve one’s material conditions has seemed a woefully 
inadequate prescription for change.11  Those politics that aren’t bent on correcting long-standing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Julia Preston and John H. Cushman, Jr., “Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S.” The New York 
Times, June 15, 20102, accessed January 21, 2014.  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-
some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 The president made a “clear play for a crucial voting bloc” via 
a summer executive order that changed immigration policy. 
Kimberley A. Strassel, “The GOP Turnout Myth,” The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2012, accessed February 
21, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578133120431803606.html 
The president generated more minority votes in some key states such as in Florida where more Hispanics turned out 
for the Democrats in 2012 than in 2008. 
New York Times, President Election Polls, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/president/exit-polls 
8 Miriam Hill, Andrew Seldman, John Duchneski, “In 59 Philadelphia voting divisions, Mitt Romney got zero 
votes,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 12, 2012, accessed February 21, 2013, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/year-in-
review/20121112_In_59_Philadelphia_voting_wards__Mitt_Romney_got_zero_votes.html?c=r  
9 Will Dunham and Jackie Frank, “Republicans say Party Needs Revamp After Romney Drubbing,” Reuters, 
November 18, 2012, accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/us-usa-politics-
republicans-idUSBRE8AH0GA20121118 
Zerlina Maxwell, “How long will the right’s recent love affair with minorities last,” The Grio, November 20, 2012, 
accessed April 28, 2013.  “The Republican party has to think on its feet before the next cycle to remake their 
tarnished image as the party of old white people.” 
10Jonathan Haidt. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and  
Religion.  (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 204.  “Liberals sometimes go beyond equality of rights to pursue 
equality of outcomes, which cannot be obtained in a capitalist system.”  
11 West, Cornel.  Race Matters.  New York: Beacon Press, 2001, 14.  “They tell black people to see themselves as 
agents, not victims… [but] to call on black people to be agents makes sense only if we also examine the dynamics of 
this victimization against which their agency will, in part, be exercised.” 
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inequities can thus be viewed as tolerating—or even fostering—racial discrimination.12  In fact, 
pundits and politicians on the Left have so regularly implied—or explicitly tied—notions of 
preserving white privilege to Republicans that the negative conflation of racism and the GOP has 
become quite common.13 This discourse feeds into a vision of Republicans sheltering racists, 
which leads to the “racist Republican” stereotype.14  
      Challenging the accuracy of this perception, Alex Tabarrok, a George Mason University 
economist, culled the General Social Survey to try to determine if bigotry can be empirically 
connected to party affiliation.  His research showed “some Americans are racists but racists split 
about evenly across the parties.”15  In a follow up study using similar methodology, George 
Washington University political scientist John Sides confirmed “neither party has a monopoly on 
racists.”16 By measuring the number of people who hold beliefs about personality traits having 
racial determiners, both Tabarrok and Sides debunked the idea of the more prevalent “racist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Tim Wise, Between Barack and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama, (San Francisco: 
City Light Books, 2009).  Racism should always be viewed as “both an idea and a structure of institutions in which 
policies, practices and procedures produce inequitable outcomes.” 
Jonathan Haidt. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and  
Religion.  (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 161.  “On the left, fairness often implies equality, but on the right it 
means proportionality…. even if that guarantees unequal outcomes.” 
13  Jimmy Carter, interview by Brian Williams, Nightly News with Brian Williams, NBC, September 12, 2009. “I 
think an overwhelming portion of the intensely demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on 
the fact that he is a black man.” 
Marv Dumon, “Video: MSNBC’s Chris Matthews accuses Romney campaign of racism,” Examiner, November 5, 
2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/video-msnbc-s-chris-matthews-accuses-romney-campaign-of-racism 
Terry McMillan, “Author Terry McMillan on Why Mitt Romney is the Wrong Man for America,” The Daily Beast, 
November 2, 2012, Accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/02/author-terry-
mcmillan-on-why-mitt-romney-is-the-wrong-man-for-america.html  McMillian writes “about just how racist the 
entire [2012] campaign season has been and how so many people either don’t see, or refuse to see, the real truth 
behind the Republicans and Mitt Romney.” 
Morgan Freeman, interview by Piers Morgan, Piers Morgan Show, CNN, September 23, 2011, 
www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/bestoftv/2011/09/23/piers-morgan-freeman-obama.cnn.html Even the voice of 
God—iconic Hollywood actor Morgan Freeman—has expressed a belief that the majority of opposition to President 
Barack Obama’s political agenda is racially motivated. 
14 W.W. Houston, “Grand Racist Party,” The Economist, August 22, 2012.  On August 18, 2012, progressive 
political television host Chris Hayes articulated what is a broadly ingrained opinion on the Left: “It is undeniably the 
case that racist Americans are almost entirely in one political coalition and not the other.”   
15 Alex Tabarrok, “Racism by Political Party,” Marginal Revolution, August 19, 2012, Accessed January 27, 2013, 
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2012/08/racism-by-political-party.html 
16 John Sides, “Are Racists Only in One Political Party?” Washington Monthly, August 20, 2012, Accessed March 9, 
2013, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2012/08/are_racists_only_in_one_politi039322.php 
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Republican” as anything more than an emotional assumption that is not supported by hard data.   
However, for the purposes of this thesis, which is intent on understanding the “racist 
Republican” as a political construct, it is essential to recognize that some intellectuals who use an 
equality-is-outcome lens have created much more robust ways to identify racial bias emanating 
from different political groups.   For instance, Cornel West’s understanding of racism relies on 
an entrenched cultural legacy in the United States that depends on oppressive economic 
hierarchies closely related to the running of a capitalist society. Per West’s vision, racism can be 
perceived within policy positions that do not increase economic equality but undermine the 
special interests of minorities.  For example, West purports the dismantling of welfare programs 
is racially intolerant because such actions have “genocidal effects on the black poor.”17  
Therefore, when looking through West’s prism, one finds a different source of materials than 
those Tabarrok and Sides measured, with which the “racist Republican” is made.   
     This is true even though using positions on policy initiatives to evidence racism is a dicey 
prospect.  Opinions on policy vary amongst individual members of any political party in the 
United States as well as between the parties themselves.  For example, a 2011 Pew study relying 
on cluster analysis demonstrated Democrats do not share monolithic political values about how 
to confront issues containing elements of race, just as Republicans are not in complete 
concordance about the role of government in addressing the needs of the poor.18 Nevertheless, it 
is rational to say members of political parties share some sense of ideological orientation that 
influences their political thought.  How one interprets racism can thereby impact how one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cornel West, Race Matters, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 58 
18 Pew Research Center, “Beyond Red vs. Blue: Political Typology,” May 4, 2011, Accessed April 28, 2013, 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue-The-Political-Typology.pdf, 30, “Solid Liberals 
and Post-Moderns – both mostly white and relatively upscale – have very different attitudes about the factors 
limiting black progress and whether further efforts are needed to achieve racial equality.” 
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interprets the intent behind political actions addressing issues that are viewed as having a racial 
component.   This idea demands closer consideration.                                                                                                         
     Therefore, Chapter One of this thesis looks at the foundations of conservative reasoning 
deployed by Republican icons, especially Ronald Reagan, to spur action (or inaction) when 
addressing issues of particular importance to African Americans.19  The goal is to determine if 
Republican ideology itself is inherently inimical to perceived minority interests as most often 
framed by civil rights groups.  Second, the “Reagan Revolution” resulted in a landslide victory 
for Ronald Reagan in 1980, yet he attracted little black support.  It is important to explore why 
Ronald Reagan was an attractive candidate for many white voters but not many black voters.  
Chapter Two focuses on perceptions about Reagan’s—and thus conservatives’—image and 
rhetoric.  Finally, Nixon political strategist Kevin Phillips has been credited with verbalizing a 
Republican “Southern strategy” that has relied on the exploitation of “the prevailing cleavages in 
American voting behavior” that fall along ethnic and cultural lines.20  Chapter Three delves 
deeper into Reagan’s perceived “Southern strategy” of appealing to white racists in 1980—as 
well as various policy positions over the course of his career—while also examining a 
Democratic “Southern strategy” potentially used by Carter to exploit the racial fears of blacks for 
political advantage.  The “Southern strategies” of both parties have relied to some extent on the 
belief that the South was, is, and remains a peculiarly racist region of the United States. 
     All of the issues explored in this thesis—the perceived racial component to (and general 
orientation of) political ideologies, the exploitation of race by Republicans, and the exploitation 
of race by Democrats—have contributed to the “racist Republican” construct that exists in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Timothy N. Thurber, Republicans and Race, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2013).  Thurber’s work 
shows a consistent neoliberal ideological underpinning driving 20th century Republican politics that has impacted 
the party’s image with minorities.  This underpinning existed for Ronald Reagan as well as other conservatives. 
20 Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), 39-40.   
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political discourse today.  They also confirm that even after electing an African American as 
president, the United States is neither a united nor a post-racial country.  This is why attaching a 
political opponent with the stigma of racism continues to be an effective campaign tactic.   
 
II.   Historiography and Context 
     Scholarship about conservative politics exploded after the 1980 ascendancy of the New Right. 
Historians like Kim Philips Fein, Lisa McGirr, David Farber, Steven A. Shull, Rick Perlstein, 
Kevin Kruse and others have closely studied Republican positioning in the twentieth century, 
which has shed light on individual players in the Republican Party, grassroots mobilizations, and 
the ideological framework used to create Republican policy agendas.  Though all of these 
historians touch to some extent on campaign strategies, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, 
Rights and Taxes on American Politics by Thomas Byrnes Edsall and Mary Edsall is the seminal 
work exploring how conservative politicians like Ronald Reagan allegedly and covertly 
exploited race and class divides for political advantage.  With direct appeals to racism no longer 
viable in “virtually” any region of the country by 1980, the Edsalls have posited Republicans 
learned to fly “the banner of a conservative ‘egalitarianism’” to tap into white populism.21 The 
possible payoffs of this strategy first came into focus when Barry Goldwater carried “the most 
anti-black electorate in the nation without facing public condemnation” by giving the South an 
ideological “cloak with which to protect racial segregation.”22  This was the first Republican 
“Southern strategy” per contemporary understanding of the term.    
     Building on this platform, scholars and journalists like Glenn Feldman, Thomas Schaller and 
Sam Tanenhaus who belong to the “Southern strategy” school of thought, have continued to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Thomas Burne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American 
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 14. 
22 Ibid., 41.	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isolate the South as persistently exceptional on matters of race, which thereby determines 
political outcomes in the region: the “South’s partisan realignment from Democratic to 
Republican is about race… and a ‘politics of emotion.’”23  The persistence of this narrative 
promotes a simple syllogism used today in the construction of the “racist Republican”:  The 
South is peculiarly racist.  The majority of people who live in the South are Republicans.  The 
majority of Republicans are peculiarly racists.  This straw man is particularly useful when 
describing the “Southernization” of the Republican Party that spills into national contests.24     
     Indeed, James C. Cobb has described the South as persistently “characterized primarily in 
terms of its perceived differences from the rest of the country,” but there is a counter-narrative.25  
Even though it is undisputable that the South was distinctly different in the Jim Crow Period, C. 
Vann Woodward cautioned decades ago against oversimplifying American history by isolating 
the South’s racial sins when there have always been “many parallel lines of prejudice and 
discrimination against the Negro in the North.”26 The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, a 
collection of essays written by leading scholars in the field of conservative studies, disputes 
oversimplifications and overgeneralizations in historical analysis that are born out of a persistent 
magnification of Southern differences.27  For example, Crespino and Lassiter have flatly 
challenged any “distorted account of political realignment that attributes the rise of modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Glenn Feldman, introduction to Painting Dixie Red: When, Where, Why, and How the South Became Republican, 
ed. Glenn Feldman (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 3.   
24 Ibid., 5. “How exactly did the South become Republican?  There is much in the unsettling answer to suggest that, 
in fact, the South did not become Republican so much as the Republican Party became Southern.” 
25 James C. Cobb, The South and America Since World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), xvii 
26 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 113. 27	  Lassiter, Matthew D. and Joseph Crespino, “Introduction: The End of Southern History,” 	  
in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, ed. by Mathew D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 12.  “Certainly by the second half of the twentieth century, if not before as well, focusing 
on the South’s aberrant qualities compared to the rest of the United States obscures much more than it reveals about 
fundamental questions of modern American history.”   
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conservatism primarily to white southern backlash against the civil rights movement.”28  Further, 
Matthew Lassiter’s book Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South: The Silent Majority highlights a 
political transformation in the South driven more by a middle-class corporate economy than a 
steadfast commitment to the color line.29  Naming Kevin Phillips “the false prophet of 
reactionary populism,” Lassiter has widened his analysis of Sunbelt politics to include the 
essential suburbs.30  This thinking is in line with Timothy N. Thurber who has written, “Claims 
by pundits and historians that the GOP adopted a ‘Southern strategy’ mischaracterize what 
happened in the mid-1960s.” 31  After all, when Richard Nixon tried to blatantly tap into white 
backlash during the 1970 midterms, the “dynamics of class and race revealed that the white 
electorate in Dixie was more varied and complex than Phillips and others realized.”32  Therefore, 
this short-lived strategy failed miserably and was quickly abandoned.   
     Therefore, though race has certainly had a large role to play in American politics that should 
never be dismissed, it is not iconoclastic to suggest that by 1980, successful conservatives like 
Ronald Reagan emphasized Sunbelt concerns over Southern concerns to win the White House.   
Moreover, though the “Southern strategy” school of thought insists white Southern voters 
continue to listen in the New Millennium for “coded language” to insure the maintenance of a 
static racial culture in the United States, the Southern realignment and the Republican Party itself 
is much more complex than this mode of thinking.  To promote a marriage between racism and 
conservative ideology in 2014—or a vision of racial innocence for the Democratic Party—is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
29 Mathew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), 227.  “A grassroots approach to the political transformation of the South reveals that the regional base 
of the Republican Party always depended more on the middle-class corporate economy than on the working class 
politics of racial backlash.” 
30 Ibid., 251.	  31	  Timothy N. Thurber, Republicans and Race: The GOP’s Frayed Relationship with African Americans, 1945-
1974 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2013), 281.  “Nixon dissolved notions of a distinct South.”	  
32 Ibid., 347.  “Republicans discovered that the Nixon and Wallace constituencies did not readily mix.” 
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construct an often ahistorical, “racist Republican” stereotype that is more a useful tool that can 
be leveraged for political gain than an actual reality.    
 
III  Sources  
     The ideas within this thesis have been balanced on the existing historiography about 
conservatives and the interplay of race with politics from 1964 to the present day.   There has 
been a special emphasis on work that offers analysis from different ideological perspectives 
about the reasoning and tactics used by notable Republican players, especially Ronald Reagan, 
when dealing with issues pertinent to minorities, which includes not just scholarly work but 
articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Nation, 
Atlanta Daily World, The Chicago Defender, Ebony and other such secondary sources.  
     Additionally, Jonathan Haidt, Yuval Levin, and Thomas Sowell have brilliantly framed 
contrasting ideological visions that effectively explain many of the philosophical clashes 
between Left and Right.  Their materials were especially useful when discerning how non-fixed 
definitions of terms like “equality” influence interpretations of political intent.  Scholars like 
Cornel West, Melvin Oliver and George Lipsitz have provided insight into why minorities feel 
the way they do about conservative ideology, race and specific legislation.  
     Finally, oceans of ink have been devoted to Ronald Reagan.  Lou Cannon, Laurence I. 
Barrett, Jonathan M. Schoenwald, Frank van der Linden, Sean Wilentz, and Craig Shirley have 
all informed this thesis with their analysis of the former president.  Reagan himself left behind a 
robust record of his opinions in speeches, radio broadcasts, letters, diaries, and an autobiography 
that have also been consulted. To address Reagan’s first successful bid for the White House, 
material about lesser figures like Lee Atwater who influenced Republican campaign strategy—
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and who continues to influence the maintenance of the “racist Republican” construct—was 
analyzed.  Most helpful were the many primary documents from the 1980 campaign, which are 
housed in the Reagan Library and Museum in Simi Valley, California.  
CHAPTER ONE: REAGAN’S FOUNDATION 
  
    President Ronald Reagan is a giant in twentieth century American politics.33  Despite the 
serious Iran-Contra scandal that rocked his second term, a CBS/New York Times poll from 
January 1989 showed he passed the baton to George H. W. Bush with a 68 percent public 
approval rating.34  When he died in 2004, tens of thousands of people showed their enduring 
affection by journeying to the nation’s capital and quietly shuffling past his coffin.35  Millions 
more tuned into his televised funeral and sunset memorial.36  Conversely, knots of activists 
spurned social decorum to stage minor protests and register discontent with the Reagan legacy.37   
     As years continue to pass, feelings expressed in public about this man—whether for good or 
ill—are amplified in the crucible of collective memory.  This was certainly evident on February 
6, 2014 at the Reagan Library and Museum in Simi Valley.  Many who had lived through what 
they felt were halcyon days of a conservative ascendency gathered to mark the fortieth 
president’s 103rd birthday.  The Marine Corps band struck up a John Philip Sousa soundtrack that 
lifted spirits higher than the grey weather.  A Tiger Squadron swooped low in the sky, flashed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011), 3.  “No other figure loomed larger on the 
political stage than Reagan or impressed his convictions and personality onto the political culture more forcefully.” 
34 Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, “A Look Back at the Polls,” CBS News, June 7, 2004, accessed February 11, 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-look-back-at-the-polls/ 
35 William Branigin, “Thousands Bid Farewell to Reagan in Funeral Service,” The Washington Post, June 11, 2004, 
accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34105-2004Jun11.html 
36 Michael Starr, “Fox Wins with Reagan,” June 15, 2004, accessed February 11, 2014, 
http://nypost.com/2004/06/15/fox-wins-with-reagan/ In addition to the millions who tuned into Reagan’s afternoon 
funeral at the National Cathedral, Nielsen estimated 35 million people watched his primetime memorial service in 
the evening.    
37 Agencies, “Reagan’s Grand Funeral Marked with Protests,” China Daily, June 12, 2004, accessed February 11, 
2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/12/content_338910.htm 
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the underbelly of a tight formation, and roared off again like jungle cats stalking game on the 
horizon.38  Raucous applause turned into a warm welcome for the first speaker: a brigadier 
general with ribbons lining half his chest.  He regaled the audience with well-heeled anecdotes 
about the Gipper’s courage. After being shot, the President had famously quipped to his wife, 
“Honey, I forgot to duck.”39   
     Then William Bennett, the former Secretary of Education and drug czar, stepped behind the 
lectern.  Thanking the general for his opening, he pondered what Reagan might have said if in 
the hospital about to be wheeled into surgery in 2014:  “Gee, Nancy, I sure hope our application 
for healthcare.gov got through?”40  The crowd exploded with laughter, but most of Bennett’s 
keynote did not reference politics in the New Millennium.  Instead, he recalled the decent man 
for whom he had worked—for whom many of the people present had voted—as an able 
commander-in-chief who hadn’t shied away from the task of leading.  Heads bobbed up and 
down in the audience.  These people innately understood Reagan’s vision of strength, honor and 
duty, which was underscored by the presence of Secretary Bennett’s Princeton educated son: a 
young man listening to the speech in a polished marine’s uniform.  There were visible reactions 
to revolving themes of patriotism, which revealed deeply held convictions worthy of action for 
many conservatives—articles of faith extending well beyond politics—that help Republicans win 
elections.  If this is true—and if one is to assume political ideologies are about something more 
than base material interests—it is essential to understand how values influenced the voters who 
put men like Reagan into public office.  Did his election have anything to do with racism?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Fred Ryan, “President Reagan’s Birthday Celebration,” presentation The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation, 
Simi Valley, CA, February 6, 2011.  The chairman of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library stood 
behind the podium’s microphone and pointed up.  “As the president would say, that is the sound of freedom.”	  
39 John W. Bullard, Jr., “President Reagan’s Birthday Celebration,” presentation at The Ronald  
Reagan Presidential Foundation, Simi Valley, CA, February 6, 2011 
40 William Bennett, “President Reagan’s Birthday Celebration,” presentation at The Ronald  
Reagan Presidential Foundation, Simi Valley, CA, February 6, 2011 
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     Though some decry polarization trends within the American electorate, it is also important to 
note that party affiliations have long been important in countries with representative 
governments.41  As far back as 1770 when the United States was but a collection of dissatisfied 
colonies with various interests pushing against prevailing powers, British MP Edmund Burke 
was arguing political factionalism is necessary to affect societal change.  This is because “whilst 
men are linked together, they easily and speedily communicate the alarm of an evil design.  They 
are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, and to oppose it with united strength.”42  When 
such men are unacquainted with collective principles, talents, and dispositions, “it is evidently 
impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy.”43  In the 
same spirit, economist Paul Krugman has argued, “to be a progressive, then, means being a 
partisan.”44  But why choose which party?  Why vote which way?  
     As neuroscience continues to develop, there is a growing body of evidence that confirms what 
Edmund Burke intuitively believed more than two hundred years ago: people are creatures of 
passion as much as they are masters of logic, so the heart and the head “think” in tandem.45  Rose 
McDermott thus posited in Perspectives on Politics that political scientists need to adjust their 
analyses to take into account the fact that emotion and reason are closely interdependent: “one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Peter Coy, “Political Polarization: It’s Worse than you Think,“ Bloomberg Business Week, October 18, 2013, 
accessed February 12, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-18/political-polarization-its-worse-
than-you-think “Political polarization has increased since the 1980s….”  
42 Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents and the Two Speeches on America.  Ed. E. J. 
Payne, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc. 1990, 1.1.142, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv1c1a.html#Vol. 1, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present 
Discontents, continued 
43 Ibid., 1.1.142 
44 Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 268. “The only way a progressive 
agenda can be enacted is if Democrats have both the presidency and a large enough majority in Congress to 
overcome Republican opposition.” 
45 Yuval Levin, The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Left and Right (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014), 57- 60.  “As Burke’s contemporary William Hazlitt put it: ‘[Burke] knew that man had affections and 
passions and powers of imagination, as well as hunger and thirst and the sense of heat and cold…. He knew that the 
rules that form the basis of private morality are not founded in reason, that is, in the abstract properties of those 
things which are the subjects of them, but in the nature of man, and his capacity of being affected by certain things 
from habit, from imagination, and sentiment, as well as from reason.’” 
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cannot exist without the other.”46 Rationalized feelings assign value to the political mechanisms 
that people think will most enrich their lives, and political movements are born from a root desire 
to live within a society that embodies the standards that various members deem worthy.  As a 
consequence, when progressive polemicist Thomas Frank once observed “because some artist 
decides to shock the hicks by dunking Jesus in urine, the entire planet must remake itself along 
the lines preferred by Republican Party, USA,” he wasn’t completely wrong.47  Values matter, 
and individuals have a deep sense of what is sacred that governs their reactions to every topic, 
from art to religion to party politics.  This does not mean that voters are tricked or manipulated 
by emotion into voting against their best interests.  On the contrary—whether they cast their lot 
with the GOP or the Democratic Party—people reason from different premises, often implicit, 
that inform their understanding of what their best interests might be.48 This is because “people 
bind themselves into political teams that share moral narratives.  Once they accept a particular 
narrative, they become blind to alternative moral worlds.”49  
     Additionally, according to an extensive study conducted by left-leaning academics Jonathan 
Haidt, Jesse Graham, and Brian Nosek, many on the Left misconstrue the motives and reactions 
of those on the Right because they honestly cannot relate to the interplay of emotion and logic 
expressed in things like the Reagan narrative.50  Instead of seeming heroic, President Reagan 
often sounded to liberals as “completely unconcerned about the welfare of drug addicts, poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Rose McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science,” 
Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 692. 
47 Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 5. 
48 Thomas Sowell, A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, Revised Edition (New York: 
Basic Books, 2007), 3. 
49 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2012), XXIII. 
50 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2012), 334. Many liberals “actively reject [conservative] concerns as immoral.”  Self-described 
liberals often incorrectly predicted conservative responses to moral questions and could not correctly process 
conservative intent. (Conservatives were much more likely to correctly predict liberal responses.) 
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people, and gay people.  He [was] more interested in fighting wars and telling people how to run 
their sex lives” than he was in creating a just country of equal citizens.51  Thereby, how people 
process morality can in part explain how movements like the Reagan Revolution are so often 
characterized in wildly divergent ways by different groups of American voters.  
     To further delve into the impact of Moral Foundations Theory, consider a core belief of the 
Left is that fairness is achieved by creating equality, but those on the Right tend to feel 
“proportional outcomes” are more fair.52  These are ideological beliefs that are sincerely 
rationalized, but there are hazards when making even noble abstracts with no fixed definitions 
into the concrete policy goals of partisans because dissonance is associated with the different 
foundational forms of reasoning used to reach certain conclusions about morality.  In simpler 
terms, visions of what equality itself actually is conflict, so voters interpret the intent and 
ultimate consequences of “equality”—and thus “equality politics”—in vastly different ways.  
Ultimately, this, too, contributes to the construction of—and belief in—the “racist Republican.”    
     To think about the hazards of different ideological visions in American politics, take into 
account a favorite, canonical short story “Harrison Bergeron” by Kurt Vonnegut.  Here a fascist 
dystopia is created when all are made “equal” through artificial means.53  Greatly lauded in 
William Buckley’s National Review, the piece’s overriding theme seems obvious to 
conservatives: government imposed equality is ridiculously oppressive.54  However, a more 
liberal reading of the well-known plot, which was written by a socialist satirist, can undercut this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid., 335 
52 Ibid., 161 
53Kurt Vonnegut, “Harrison Bergeron,” Welcome to the Monkey House (New York: Dell Publishing, 1968), 7-14.  
Innate talents are neutralized for all characters via different government imposed handicaps such as bags on the 
faces of the pretty or weights that hold down the strong.   
54 John J Miller, “Vonnegut, RIP,” National Review, April 12, 2007, accessed February 15, 2014, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/140655/vonnegut-rip/john-j-miller  “At any rate, Vonnegut was also the 
author of ‘Harrison Bergeron,’ a wonderful short story that makes the utterly conservative point that forced equality 
is the enemy of freedom.”   
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interpretation.  Despite the hyper-egalitarian environment in which he was raised, the story’s 
protagonist appears intent on using his considerable talents to lord over others. 55  Therefore, 
neutralizing Harrison Bergeron’s advantages is necessary in an ethical society concerned with 
closing unjust performance gaps and leveling the classes.  
     These contrasting readings, which depend wholly on how one approaches the text, resonate 
powerfully and differently for Americans with dissimilar foundational feelings about 
egalitarianism.  There is more than one way to see equality, and it is difficult to reach true 
consensus on the meaning of even a short piece of fiction because it is hard to broaden one’s 
underlying emotional understanding of certain concepts once they become fixed by emotional 
attachment.  Yet people—both unconsciously and deliberately—persist in using narrow 
interpretive lenses in politics that do not allow for alternate moral matrices.  This practice often 
distorts political analysis in a realm of emotional half-truths born from conflicting values visions.   
     For example, having been reduced by LBJ’s campaign machine into a crazed zealot, Senator 
Barry Goldwater—the man widely credited with shifting the Republican Party to the 
conservative wing from which Reagan would lead it—observed years after losing his bid for the 
presidency, “If I didn’t know Goldwater in 1964, and I had to depend on the press, I’d have 
voted against the son of a bitch myself.”56 Though it’s important to understand part of the 
Democrats’ strategy had been to turn Goldwater into a caricature, many journalists really 
believed—honestly felt—that the Arizonan running for the highest office in the land was “a 
fascist, a racist, a trigger-happy warmonger, a nuclear madman,” when they helped brand him as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 When Harrison Bergeron throws off the shackles that reduce his abilities and make him “equal” to everyone else, 
he cries, “I am the Emperor!  Everybody must do what I say at once!”  This possible tyranny is halted by Diana 
Moon Clampers, the Handicapper General, who murders Bergeron and his consort.  All are “equal” again, and life is 
returned to “normal.” 
56 Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1995), 320. 
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such.57   This was true despite Goldwater’s long history as a compassionate capitalist whose 
main issue as an Arizona politician had been to turn back New Deal encroachments on private 
enterprise and individual freedom, not to blow up the free world or to stop the progression of 
civil rights.58  To further complicate matters, some intellectuals have explored how internalized 
attitudes about contradictory currents in modern political life can form the basis for political 
coalitions that capitalize on singular issues.   For example, Thomas and Mary Edsall have 
portrayed race as the main driver of Republican—or, more accurately, conservative—appeals to 
voters, which they have contended broadened an anti-government coalition in 1968 that would 
be exploited by Republicans running for office later. That year George Wallace, a Southern 
segregationist, conducted a racialized campaign against liberal initiatives like busing and other 
Great Society programs that benefitted poor blacks.  The Esdalls said Wallace’s success with 
some voters cracked the electoral door for some Republicans who did not mind using Wallace’s 
populist tactics to eventually take over the executive branch of government.59  
     To some extent, there is merit in this argument because race mattered to the exclusion of other 
issues for some voters in the 1960s, but it is much too narrow a view for analyzing broader 
political trends.  It does not allow for the myriad of “social issues” or “values” that prompt the 
vast American middle to support one candidate over another outside of any social extreme.60  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Bart Barnes, “Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies,” Washington Post, May 30, 1998, A01, accessed February 20, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwater30.htm 
58 Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Origins of the Conservative Ascendancy: Barry Goldwater’s Early Senate Career and 
the De-Legitimization of Organized Labor,” The Journal of American History 95, no. 3 (Dec. 2008), 696.  “The 
image of Goldwater as a trigger-happy cold warrior is more a product of Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1964 presidential 
campaign against Goldwater than his actual politics…. Goldwater targeted Keynsian fiscal policy, intrusive 
government planning, and a politically active labor movement as the main threats to the American body politic.” 
59 Thomas Burne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American 
Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 78.  “Wallace helped to put in place the foundation of what ten years 
later would become a groundswell of discontent… essential to the strengthening of Republican presidential 
prospects.” 
60 Ben J. Wattenberg, Values Matter Most (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 12-13.  In The Real Majority, which 
Wattenberg and R. Scammon published in 1970, they argued, “unless the Democrats paid serious attention to that 
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other words, though racial discord was certainly important in 1968—and Richard Nixon and 
George Wallace used some of the same conservative language when campaigning—there were 
multiple issues being processed in multiple ways by voters with multiple visions throughout the 
sixties and into other decades.  After all, in 1952, Republican Dwight Eisenhower had been able 
to chip away four states from the “solid South” block though neither candidate had emphasized 
race in that early election.61 Additionally, members of the States’ Rights Party of 1948, which 
had been formed purely to protest the important civil rights initiatives put forth by President 
Truman, had returned to voting for Democrats, which means the “racist vote” had not gone into 
the GOP column.62  Yet even in the Deep South, Eisenhower won many districts.63  This showed 
as V. O. Key had observed in 1949: “[the South’s] rate of evolution may [have seemed] glacial 
but fundamental shifts in the conditions [were] taking place.”64   
     That said, four years after Dwight Eisenhower retired, and four years before the American 
Independent Party nominated the “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” 
candidate to carry their third party banner, Barry Goldwater’s libertarian vision, which projected 
a ‘state’s rights’ federalism, was reduced to an unfortunate “Southern strategy” that served to 
alienate blacks and provide early materials for the “racist Republican” construct.  Ironically, 
Goldwater’s popularity—and the “Draft Goldwater” effort that had first begun after his 
resounding 1958 reelection to the Senate—was born out of the Arizonan’s ability to champion 
Americans who had growing fears about the tyrannical nature of concentrated power that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
socially turbulent center, they would likely keep on losing in the national arena.”  Nixon won in 1968 because he 
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saw as restricting their freedoms, the very sort of thing that was subjecting Southern blacks to 
second class citizenship.65  However, Goldwater’s beliefs in local control and individual liberty 
attracted both strict Constitutionalists and Jim Crow segregationists to form a strange fruit 
coalition that coincided with the observations of such within Chain Reaction. This coalition 
naturally pushed minority voters further away from the Right and gave succor to whites who 
wished to maintain the status quo of racial oppression.66  As Lovelyn Evans lamented to the 
National Federation of Republican Women, “It is not easy for a Negro to be a Republican.”67  
     Clearly Goldwater’s candidacy would eventually cause a shift in national voter perceptions 
about the different political parties’ involvement in the Civil Rights Movement though there is 
little evidence that Goldwater had ever desired a conflation of his views with the antipathies of 
racists.68  Overwhelmingly Democratic, “blacks fundamentally disagreed with several core 
values routinely touted by Republicans” such as faith in private enterprise.69  Therefore, with 
limited resources, it seemed a rational—not racial—decision to abandon minority voters when 
abandoning the Industrial East to Kennedy.  In fact, when Goldwater first said he was going to 
“go hunting where the ducks [were],” he was speaking about campaigning in regions like the 
Deep South—and the Midwest and West—to find conservatively minded people whom he 
understood shared a sense of deep scorn for the pomposity of the “effete elite,” not to target 
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voters who had similar attitudes about Jim Crow. 70  Goldwater’s anti-establishment approach 
had also seemed to be working in 1963.  The more patrician Kennedy made what would be an 
ill-fated journey to Texas in part because his approval rating had fallen to a dangerously low 38 
percent in that state; pollster Samuel Lubell had given him only a “small edge” over his potential 
challenger.71  He had needed to shore up Southern support, but then a sniper’s bullet completely 
changed the electoral equation.72  
     As LBJ capitalized on Kennedy’s death to push forward civil rights, Barry Goldwater’s 
personal feelings about segregation were trumped by his intransigence about the proper role of 
federal government.  Blacks like Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the NAACP, viewed 
Goldwater’s indifference—if not hostility—to fixing the plight of blacks as dangerous: “Voting 
for Barry Goldwater as president would be placing the fate of Negroes into the hands of Ross 
Barnett of Mississippi and George Wallace of Alabama.”73  Whitney M. Young purported, “the 
issues go beyond Goldwater as an individual.”74  Indeed, Harry Golden made his attacks a bit 
more personal.  Writing in the Chicago Defender, he scorned not just Barry Goldwater but 
Republicans in general for sharing a flawed—and hypocritical—political philosophy in which 
government aid should be rejected unless that government aid was serving Republican purposes.  
Recalling President Eisenhower’s admonition that “law can’t change the hearts of men,” Golden 
admonished that law changed the actions of men, and that was the only thing that mattered to 
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blacks in that moment.75  Additionally, though he had long been a Republican, Jackie Robinson’s 
rebukes of Goldwater were scathing.  He refused in an open letter to accept an invitation of the 
senator’s to even talk over dinner: “Relating to your proposal that we discuss civil rights, what 
could you possibly have to say?”76     
     Many others in the minority community understood that Goldwater’s position could prove 
detrimental to blacks living in the South, even as many segregationists understood Goldwater’s 
ideology could be twisted to their purposes.  However, the Goldwater and Wallace positions 
were always different.  When an offer was extended by George Wallace’s camp to switch to the 
Republican Party and join Goldwater on his 1964 ticket—a move that truly would have 
consolidated federalism with segregationism—Goldwater’s response was a quick, “Go to hell!”77  
These two men did not share the same ethos about race. Consider when a bomb went off outside 
of a black student’s University of Alabama housing, Wallace pondered how long it would take 
“to get the nigger bitch out of the dormitory.”78  But Goldwater had sanctioned the goals of the 
“freedom riders” engaged in constitutionally protected interstate commerce.79  Wallace said in 
1959, “How in the name of common sense can you be too strong about segregation?  You’re 
either for it or against it.”80  Goldwater’s department store in Arizona was voluntarily integrated 
with blacks in supervisory roles well before the Civil Rights Movement ever gained legislative 	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242. 
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231.  Goldwater also helped end legal segregation in Phoenix’s schools and the National Guard. Codified inequality 
was as big an assault to the liberty foundation on which he built his thoughts, as codified “equality” had the potential 
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momentum.81  George Wallace was a political opportunist who had transformed like a 
resurrected Tom Watson from purporting a progressive agenda in his home state to engaging in 
racial demagoguery to gain power.82  Barry Goldwater’s entire political career was built on a 
consistent worldview that promoted minimal federal intervention in the lives of Americans.83   
     Furthermore, when Wallace withdrew from the race for president on July 19, 1964 with the 
claim that the Republicans had offered a segregationist platform that made his candidacy moot, 
Goldwater found this description of the vision that the Republicans under his leadership had 
endorsed to be baffling.84  Certainly the 1964 platform passed at the July convention stressed the 
conservative commitment “to help assure equal opportunity and a good education for all, while 
opposing federally-sponsored ‘inverse discrimination,’ whether by the shifting of jobs, or the 
abandonment of neighborhood schools, for reasons of race,” but the platform also pledged “full 
implementation and faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and all other civil rights 
statutes, to assure equal rights and opportunities guaranteed by the Constitution to every 
citizen.”85  Though it is understandable that many blacks thought his personal stance on race was 	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irrelevant in light of their own oppression, Goldwater’s objections to the passage of certain civil 
rights legislation had never been about maintaining segregation, which he found morally 
reprehensible. When some of his political operatives wanted to capitalize more directly on white 
backlash a la the Governor of Alabama—and some operatives engaged in direct pandering to 
racists—Goldwater indicated he felt such actions were not only wrong but dangerous. After 
telling reporters he would quit the campaign “if anyone sowed racial violence on his behalf… 
even if it was the day before the election,” he met with LBJ and vowed to not fan racial tensions 
for political gain.86  
      This is important to understand because Goldwater—not Wallace—was the foundation upon 
which conservative Republicans would build their future thinking, and the country would not 
always be mired in the same sort of civil rights debate that existed in 1964.  For example, John 
Sears, a future campaign manager for Ronald Reagan, offered an explanation for the evolution of 
the Republican Party into the New Right when he identified Goldwater as the first serious 
presidential contender to challenge the principles of the New Deal and to thus open the 
emotional and intellectual doors required for ending the era of big government.87  There was also 
an element of populist nationalism used to create “value wedges” for the Goldwater campaign 
from the very beginning that Reagan echoed.  No one talked more down-to-earth and apple pie 
than the anti-elite Barry with his ham radios and appreciation for American Indians and solid 
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record as a World War II pilot doing his duty in Asia.   He used patriotism and liberty to whip up 
the decidedly conservative Young Americans for Freedom as early as March 1961.88   
     Therefore, when scholars purport the normative narrative that Richard Nixon “retooled” and 
Ronald Reagan “perfected” the terms first drafted by segregationist George Wallace, there seems 
to be a narrowing of focus that misses a broader rhetorical picture that would include the man 
who was speaking loud and clear about American values apart from the governor of Alabama.89  
In other words, even when Wallace coined clever phrases like “limousine liberal” that would 
become part of the broader political lexicon for politicians of both parties, he wasn’t the original 
source of conservative populism.90  Blasting the “power elite” and “big government” had been 
the heart of the Goldwater message.  Therefore, though he failed in his goals to win higher 
office, Goldwater was the one who left a legacy blueprint others would modify—maybe even 
George Wallace followed—to forward conservatively oriented agendas, and Goldwater’s 
motives were not tied to keeping the color line in tact.   
     Additionally, it is important to note Goldwater’s candidacy imploded outside any repudiation 
of a ‘state’s rights’ mantra.   The attacks used against him—the negative and distorting 
commercials put forth by the Johnson campaign such as the Daisy ad, which suggested voting for 
Goldwater was equivalent to voting for nuclear apocalypse—also left an indelible mark on 
American elections and impacted 1964 voters.91   This had more to do with how mass attack ads 
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were deployed on television than with the introduction of dirty campaign tactics about race, 
which are as old as politics.  LBJ himself once described the ruthless methods he had first 
deployed in a low-stakes campus election when he was but a student who wanted to be a part of 
his small college’s student council: “It was a pretty vicious operation for a while.  They lost 
everything I could have them lose.  It was my first real big dicta[tor]—Hitlerized—operation, 
and I broke their back good.  And it stayed broke for a good long time.”92    
     The bellicose Texan whom Barry Goldwater had once described as “the biggest faker in the 
United States” broke Goldwater’s back good—the Arizonan was defeated by the largest margin 
in the history of American presidential politics—but the federalist ideas that Goldwater put forth 
would prove transcendent.93  This was in part because of a Hollywood actor turned General 
Electric spokesman who had co-chaired Goldwater’s campaign in California, who believed 
deeply in conservative causes, and who was asked to deliver a speech on television in Los 
Angeles shortly before the 1964 election.94  This speech was dubbed “A Time for Choosing,” 
and it raised millions of dollars for a flailing Goldwater campaign.  Even former president 
Dwight Eisenhower had taken notice.95   
     Ronald Reagan had walked onto the stage and commanded the audience like an understudy 
who should have been cast the star in the first place.  Goldwater faltered on Election Day, but 
heavy Republican hitters in the Golden State helped Reagan pick up the conservative banner and 
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run with it straight to the governor’s mansion in 1967.96  It seemed though he had long been a 
concerned citizen openly engaged in politics—his celebrity and a contract as the host of the 
downhome General Electric Theatre had provided him with the perfect public platform to 
express and crystalize his opinions—Reagan’s political career as a candidate himself was quite 
literally launched by the Goldwater campaign.97  Yet the charismatic actor gave off a much 
different vibe than the man from Phoenix and connected with a much broader audience.   
     Additionally, it is interesting to note, despite the cowboy images Reagan and Goldwater 
projected—their embodiments of rugged individualism expressed through a mutual love for the 
great outdoors—these men were not close friends.  This might partially be because of different 
backgrounds that made a closer connection between the two harder to maintain.  They had 
enjoyed very different sorts of childhoods.  Goldwater had grown up in big sky deserts.  Reagan 
had sprung from the silo-dotted Midwest.   One had been a privileged son whose Jewish father 
had owned department stores.  The other had been the youngest child in a family headed by a 
shoe salesman whose alcoholism meant he regularly provided little more than “oatmeal meat” 
for his wife and kids to eat.98  These icons had taken different routes to conservatism, and they 
had very different styles on the campaign trail.99   Yet many of their foundational visions of how 
the world should work were interchangeable, and thus one might say they were imperfect 
reflections of each other.  
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     Whether or not they went on family vacations together, Ronald Reagan revered Barry 
Goldwater.  Along with William Buckley, founder of National Review and host of the PBS show 
Firing Line, Reagan felt Goldwater was responsible for creating the New Right.100  The 
conservative ideas Goldwater espoused had pushed Reagan to test the parity of his conscious 
reasoning with the raw essence of his core values, and this had resulted in a different way of 
processing politics.  Once a fervent New Dealer—a man whose favorite president was the 
optimistic FDR for whom he’d first voted when he was just in his twenties—Reagan had slowly 
discovered the Democratic Party and his ideology were irreconcilable.101  He had divorced the 
party of his youth and publically joined the GOP in 1962.102   
     Furthermore, though delivered on Goldwater’s behalf, “A Time for Choosing” laid bare how 
Reagan felt about the issues four years before George Wallace fashioned his 1968 appeal to the 
working class.  The themes within that speech would be forever after played throughout the 
Reagan Narrative.  How one received those themes would continue to depend upon the moral 
foundations of politics Jonathan Haidt has said people use when constructing meaning about the 
intent of someone else’s ideas.   Perhaps anticipating future misinterpretations of his views, 
Reagan delivered during the address the well-known laugh line: “The trouble with my liberal 
friends is not that they’re ignorant; it’s just that they know so much that isn’t so.”103 
     Sure enough, it did not take long before there were several examples of how Reagan rubbed 
the Left in the wrong way.  When running for governor, he was a relentless advocate for security 
as a necessary component of civil society.  He was especially intent on combatting what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid., 354 
101 Craig Shirley, Rendezvouz with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America (Wilmington: 
ISI Books, 2009), 7.  
102 David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 164-
170. 
103 Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” The Reagan Foundation, October 27, 1964, transcript accessed 
February 25, 2014, http://www.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/ATimeForChoosing.pdf 
	   28	  
conservatives saw as the flouting of authority by student activists out of line on college 
campuses.104  Jonathan Schoenwald has noted this “emphasis on law and order echoed much of 
Goldwater’s race-coded language, especially after the Watts riots of 1965.”105   But one should 
note, though there were racial dimensions to some of the unrest in 1960s-era California, 
Schoenwald’s interpretation of Reagan’s “law and order” rhetoric at that time as “race-coded” 
contains an implicit denial that there were reasons outside of what were rising racial tensions to 
call for more security in the state.  For example, though the face of student radicalism was 
predominantly white, Reagan showed little tolerance for disruptions that threatened violence on 
college campuses.  He had great disdain for the “anti-almost anything demonstrations” that were 
so often run by radical dissidents.106  Therefore, reducing rhetoric about containing the California 
chaos into an appeal to racial antipathies is distortive.      
     Many years later, on her road to becoming Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice spent a good 
deal of her academic career in California as provost of Stanford University where she would also 
have to get tough and tamp down unrest within her own student body.  Such trials recalled the 
reaction her father once had to some of the more significant turbulence Americans experienced 
in the sixties in which Reagan was first campaigning.  Even though he was a life-long 
Republican, Dr. Rice was also a black Southerner who had fervently supported LBJ’s part in 
pushing Congress to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, both of 
which Reagan had opposed.  Rice saw those laws as essential corrections to an unequal society, 
sorely needed corrections for blacks to gain access to their birthrights as equal American 	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citizens.   He even threw his support behind Bobby Kennedy for president in 1968.  But after 
RFK’s assassination, Rice evaluated the political situation in a country that seemed to him to 
have gone mad.  He told his daughter he had decided to cast his vote for Richard Nixon because 
Nixon “would bring order” back.107  One did not need to be white to want stability.   
     Another topic that got Reagan into hot water in 1976—the very year in which Condoleeza 
Rice would cast her first vote in a presidential election (for Jimmy Carter)—was his 
“unrestrained” rhetoric against busing, which Reagan felt incited racial animosity without 
improving the quality of education for children.108  Having relocated to Denver in the late 1960s 
when busing was ramping up, the first black woman secretary of state’s parents had expressed 
some of the same concerns that Reagan expressed about this approach to integration.  Dr. and 
Mrs. Rice scrimped to send their daughter to a private Catholic school where such government 
schemes could not adversely impact her education because they were not convinced that “black 
kids would learn better just by sitting in a classroom with white ones.”109  Though the irony was 
not lost on them, surely the Rices’ feelings were not born from racism, and some studies suggest 
their skepticism was mainstream.  For example, data extracted from a large national sample and 
published in 1974 indicated the “subjective motivations for opposing busing [were] not racism 
even though opposition [had] the objective consequence of perpetuating segregation and 
educational inequality.”110 Moreover, there were objections within the broader African American 
community to busing that are sometimes overlooked by historians.  
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     For instance, D. F. Glover, a former principal who was on the staff of Clark College in 
Atlanta in 1971, penned a forceful letter to the Atlanta Daily World in which he pointed out “a 
handful of persons must not be permitted to continue making decisions for the majority of the 
black population” specifically on issues regarding “total integration, busing, and the unitary 
school system” because this small assembly “treated the black mass like a group of paralyzed 
and unconscious victims of an inferior environment whose lot cannot be worsened by any 
experimental arrangement, regardless of how stupid.”111  He pointed out many of the educational 
accomplishments of blacks before even Brown v. Board in much the same way that Stanford 
University’s Thomas Sowell would do in Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality.112  Showing 
sympathy with this position, Atlanta’s oldest continuously running black newspaper announced 
in 1970 the formation of a national committee with representatives from thirty-two states to 
express that “the majority of blacks refuse to ‘buy’ what white radicals are selling” and would 
rather discuss issues facing “the black silent majority” such as their own “opposition to forced 
school busing to effect school integration.”113   
     This does not mean that some African Americans did not see a real connection between 
racism and busing that surely existed in school districts around the country. 114  But it also means 
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that there is little doubt that not all opposition to busing was rooted in racism; there were 
problems associated with the practice that were real and needed to be addressed.  It is also 
difficult to determine where the tipping point was for when other rational objections outweighed 
parents’ concerns about race when considering the merits of busing.  Many parents—white and 
black—were not persuaded that the only path to integration was through balancing student 
populations in this manner.  Many parents felt such practices were detrimental.  Therefore, it was 
legitimate for politicians to try to address parents’ concerns.      
     However, even when Ronald Reagan’s policy goals tracked with some of the feelings of black 
Americans such as those of the Rice family and the “silent black majority” alluded to in the 
Atlanta Daily World, he was horrible at establishing a good rapport with black voters—into 
tapping into their moral matrices—even when earnestly attempting to do so.  For example, 
though polls registered zero support from—and zero need for support from—the black 
community in his first bid for governor—and other elections—Reagan insisted “there be total 
Negro involvement in every phase of his campaign.”115  Yet he often damaged himself by 
offending African Americans out of what may have been sheer cultural ignorance.  For example, 
during the 1976 Republican primary against Gerald Ford, he called an able-bodied state aid 
recipient a “young buck.”   He was told that this phrase could be viewed as an offensive 
reference to black males, and Reagan never used it on the campaign trail again.116  The 
intentional dropping of lingo of this sort is nonsensical if the phrase was intended to be some sort 
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of coded wink at racist whites.  Rather, it was an example of cultural insensitivity that hurt 
Reagan’s case with minorities.  Such insensitivity would happen again.   
     Decades after his presidency ended, the depth of the offense taken by some of Reagan’s 
rhetoric can still be felt in the African American community.  The Journal of Blacks in Higher 
Education has recorded Ronald Reagan “produced a fictitious ‘welfare queen’ from Chicago 
who was living off the public trough while hard-working people were grappling with hyper-
inflation” to make a subtle appeal to racial prejudice.117   The idea is clear: Reagan created a 
(black) villain to bilk (white) workers.  However, many conservatives “hear” the story of the 
“welfare queen” in a much different way than, apparently, some black academics.  Per Jonathan 
Haidt’s research on moral foundations, the reason such talk resonates often has little to do with 
race but a lot to do with ideas about what is socially fair.   This is why the “welfare queen” 
anecdote was effective outside any racial “code.”  
     Moreover, whatever his underlying motive for referring to her, the con artist on whom 
Reagan built his government-cheating archetype was not fictitious.  He also never ascribed a 
name or race to this symbol for welfare fraud when he talked about her in public.118  He also did 
not coin the term “welfare queen.”  Rather this moniker’s origin can be found in the Chicago 
Tribune, which “lavished attention on Taylor’s jewelry, furs and Cadillac—all of which were 
real.”119 George Bliss, a multiple Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, had used Taylor as a tool to 
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capture the public’s imagination and garner attention for the widespread fraud dovetailing with 
government waste that he was investigating in Illinois.120  
     Bliss’s articles obviously hit an emotional chord with one reader: the once governor of 
California.  After working hard with Democratic legislators to compromise in Sacramento on 
welfare reform—an issue that he felt was connected to the very solvency of his state—Reagan 
seemed to be personally affronted by any such examples of blatant malfeasance in the public 
sphere.121  Though he also understood the need for safety nets in the system—his family had 
benefitted from some provided by the New Deal during the Great Depression—his rhetoric 
suggested welfare fraud, which bilked the taxpayer in the name of the needy, was the very 
definition of immoral.  Even so, Reagan’s emotional approach could at times be demagogic: red 
meat for conservatives who viewed redistribution as unfair.  For this reason, from the Left’s 
perspective, even if Reagan’s outrage was colorblind, his reference to the Chicago case still put a 
black face on welfare recipients that undermined needed assistance from the state for many poor 
citizens who were nothing like Linda Taylor.  For liberals, Reagan’s story about the “welfare 
queen” felt racist.  Therefore, it fed racism.   
     Of course, there is a broader political and social cost associated with making these sorts of 
equivalencies.  Thomas and Mary Edsall have observed persistent conflation of racism with 
conservative values stunts the ability of politicians from either party to address legitimate social 
problems impacting voters.122  For example, when the Moynihan Report was released in 1965, it 	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provoked such a hostile outcry from the Left that “liberal scholars were frightened away from 
[further] examination of the interrelationships between race, class, family structures and 
poverty.”123 Yet the Edsalls have accused Reagan of connecting rising taxes to special interest 
groups to forward what was specifically an anti-black (and anti-woman and anti-gay) policy 
agenda.124  This is similar to the views of George Lipstz who has written about the “racialized 
nature of social policy” with its “possessive investment in whiteness,” which has been tied to 
“overtly race-conscious neoconservative reactions against liberalism since the Nixon years.”125  
Further working with a definition of “equality” that runs counter to conservative thinking, Linda 
Faye Williams has also proposed the only way to confront “white skin privilege” is to have “a 
significant redistribution of income and wealth, more consumption, and less capitalization.”126 
Therefore, when refracted through a liberal moral narrative, almost any race-neutral reasoning to 
preserve the free market—or to discuss social conditions that might cause different wealth 
classes—can be “shown” to have negatively racial undertones.  
      Regardless, by the time Ronald Reagan was gearing up to change his residence from a ranch 
in California to the White House, the world looked much different than it had looked when he 
had first entered the political realm as a candidate.  A full generation had passed since Brown v. 
Board of Education.   Jim Crow had been killed and buried, even if the specter of his ghost 
would not die.  Yet time and again, “Republicans and African Americans approached racial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abuse to non-participation in the labor force to standards of social obligation—has for more than two decades 
created a values barrier between Democratic liberals and much of the electorate at large.”   
123 Ibid., 54-55.	  
124 Ibid., 206.  “For disaffected white voters, Reagan drew the connection between taxes and ‘groups’ and ‘special 
interests’—adding to Republican rhetorical phrases and words that now bore a new meaning—signifying for many 
working and middle-class voters the reliable opposition of Reagan and the Republican party to benefits targeted at 
blacks, feminists, homosexuals, and others seeking new rights, protections, or preferences from government.” 
125 George Lipsitz, “The Possessive Investment in Whiteness,” in White Privelege: Essential readings on the other 
side of racism, 3rd edition, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: Worth Publishers, 2008), 69-70.  This creates 
“contemporary racism.” 
126 Linda Faye Williams, “The Constraint of Race: American Social Policy at the Dawn of a New Century,” in White 
Privelege: Essential readings on the other side of racism, 3rd edition, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: Worth 
Publishers, 2008), 94. 
	   35	  
questions with sharply contrasting histories, beliefs, and interests.”127  Working at cross-
purposes, the different policy positions supported by these two groups underscored seemingly 
irreconcilable conflicts in visions. Reductionist narratives further distorted the original intents of 
Republican politicians and made minority voters wary of them.   
     No matter. In 1980 Ronald Reagan would still have his rendezvous with destiny.   
 
CHAPTER TWO:  STARTING A REVOLUTION 
     On November 2, 1980, Ronald Reagan trounced Jimmy Carter with 489 electoral votes as 
well as a majority of the popular vote.128  Regionally speaking, the defeated incumbent 
performed the best in the Deep South, which Barry Goldwater had once “flipped” for the 
Republicans in part due to his stance on the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  In Reagan’s case, when 
looking closely at the final returns, the margins of victory in these Deep South states were hardly 
decisive and could have easily gone the other way.  The margin in Alabama, for instance, was 
nothing to brag about: a tiny sliver of 1.3%.  In Mississippi he claimed a mere 1.32% more votes 
than Carter who had carried the Magnolia State in 1976.  In South Carolina where Lee 
Atwater—a young campaign coordinator and protégé of political powerhouse Strom 
Thurmond—had worked to pull out all the stops, the margin was but 1.53%.  Only in Louisiana 
did the California governor show what might be described as a comfortable 5.45% margin.  He 
soundly lost Carter’s home state of Georgia by 14.81%, and other “Old Confederacy” states such 
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as Tennessee, which had been going off and on for Republican presidential candidates since 
1920, were barely secured with as few as five thousand votes separating the candidates.129   
     These numbers are important because the closeness of the final Southern vote does not suggest 
a preference for one candidate over the other per any persistent white “backlash” such as that 
which had obviously existed in 1964.  Republican Barry Goldwater was crushed nationally, but 
he pulled 87% of the predominantly Democratic white vote in Mississippi.130  Then George 
Wallace easily claimed the Magnolia State back from Republicans in 1968 when running on a 
distinctly segregationist platform.131  Therefore, it seems fair to say Barry Goldwater’s 
resounding success in the Deep South can be explained by the region’s concern about 
segregation at the time he ran, but 1964 was not the beginning of a wholesale realignment in the 
region to the Republican Party.132  Additionally, though many in the South would shift by 1972 
from being Democratically affiliated voters into a column of non-partisans, Republican 
identification remained very low, and there was hardly “any notable burgeoning of Republican 
sympathies under the guise of Independence.”133   
     This is true even though Douglas Gatlin had observed in 1975 that race issues impacted short-
term voting trends in Dixie, and the Democratic alignment with African Americans meant, 
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“ironically” that “Republicans [had] replaced the Democrats as the party in the better position to 
play upon the racial fears that [lingered] among many southern whites.”134  Yet the South would 
not remain hyper-focused on segregation.  When Reagan projected the exact same federalist 
ethos in 1980 as Goldwater had in 1964, his returns in Dixie were nowhere near as strong as 
Goldwater’s had been.  In fact, a majority of the southern congressional districts carried by 
George Wallace in 1968 voted for Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980. 135  Reagan’s returns looked 
much closer to Eisenhower’s in 1952 than Goldwater’s in 1964.  Like Ike he had returns showed 
he had performed the best in Southern districts with more wealth.136  Therefore, voter defection 
to the Republican Party in 1980 seemed to be more economically than racially driven.   
     Moreover, though he would moderate his position on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Reagan had 
long moved from being a private citizen actor giving a stirring speech on behalf of someone else, 
into a state office holder with a record that demonstrated he was loath for any higher government 
power to intervene in local affairs unless absolutely necessary.137  If Southerners were still 
focused on the same issues that had invigorated them during Goldwater’s run—if ‘state’s rights’ 
in a racialiazed context was the main criterion by which Southerners determined which man they 
wanted to put in office—the Republican candidate would have swept the Deep South decisively 
despite the incumbent candidacy of a Southern son.  The state-by-state returns simply don’t 
suggest this as having been the reality.  
     To go further, when finally a serious contender for president, Reagan was asked by William 
Buckley to talk about a series of issues as if he had already gained the highest office in the land 	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on the popular public affairs show Firing Line.   Addressing what he would do in the face of race 
riots in Detroit, Reagan said: 
Well, I would be inclined to say that that was a problem for the local authorities in 
Detroit, unless those local authorities were unable to control the situation and had called 
on the federal government for martial help.  And maybe one of the things [that has] been 
happening too much is the federal government has been interfering where they haven’t 
been invited in.138   
 
When pressed on this matter, Reagan referred back to his time as California’s governor when 
there was a great deal of unrest on college campuses as crystalizing his perspective.  He had 
chosen to defer to local authorities to handle rioting without interference from Sacramento until 
this was no longer possible.139  
     This clear—not coded—declaration that Reagan still believed firmly in federalism might have 
telegraphed to the white South that the candidate intended to allow local people to deal with local 
problems including those related to forced integration.  Yet such matters were not on the minds 
of most Southerners in 1980.  Their public schools had already become much more integrated 
throughout the 1970s, even as public schools in the Northeast had become more segregated.140 
Open racism was also no longer socially acceptable in polite society as it had once been, and race 
politics had gotten downright moderate, even in Deep South states like Georgia. Consider when 
Jimmy Carter was inaugurated governor in Atlanta in 1970, he proclaimed, “I say to you quite 
frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over.  Our people have already made this major 
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and difficult decision.”141  Surely racism still existed, but widespread voter suppression through 
intimidation, a codified color line, and systemic electoral malapportionment that privileged rural 
white supremacists over metropolitan moderates had been relegated to the past.142 An 
increasingly dynamic economy and growing middle class had also decreased any real sense of 
“Southern exceptionalism” as the culture had steadily evolved within Sunbelt circumstances.  
Yes, the South retained conservative cultural values, but these were in line with other American 
states in which Jim Crow had never had the same presence.       
     Additionally, in a 1980 pre-election poll conducted by CBS News/New York Times, the 
biggest concern across ideological groups was not race but inflation.143  There was a “low ebb” 
of American confidence, a debilitating “mood of pessimism” after military defeats abroad and 
rising unemployment at home, a “bleakness” in the daily lives of a demoralized people who felt 
their system had failed.144  People of all political persuasions had grown weary of the “misery 
index” coming out of Washington, which had lost credibility when it came to solving the 
country’s problems.  Conservatives were not alone in disdaining a leader who “[felt] their 
pain.”145 The world was a complicated, dangerous place that called for more than American 
resignation on the global stage, and as Ted Kennedy pollster Peter Hart identified, “people 
[wanted] a president who [could] get things done.”146 
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     Perhaps for all of these reasons, William Buckley believed the most important factor in 
Reagan’s first successful bid for the White House had nothing at all to do with a “Southern 
strategy” exploiting race, but was predicated on his early opposition to the Panama Canal 
Treaties. Taking Carter’s part in this case, Buckley himself had felt Central America needed to 
be stabilized, but he had understood many Americans were in no mood to concede ground to a 
tin-pot dictator in their own hemisphere.  Therefore, the Panama Canal issue had galvanized the 
conservative base that was so essential in launching a conservative candidate.147  In fact, any 
position other than opposition to the treaties was regarded as apostasy on the Right—as was the 
case when Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker—and could derail a GOP nomination.148  
Though he had vigorously debated the canal issue with his old friend Reagan on Firing Line, 
Buckley was most charmed when Reagan still invited him to his house for dinner.  As the 
founder of the National Review made his way up the drive, he had read three cardboard signs 
displayed at intervals purely for his benefit and Reagan’s amusement.  They read in order, “WE 
BUILT IT,” “WE PAID FOR IT,” “IT’S OURS!”149 
     Of course, whatever preoccupied white voters in 1980, black voters were definitely not 
Reaganites.  The Gipper would receive “the lowest percentage of the black vote of any 
Republican presidential candidate in history.”150 One reason for this abysmal result was the 
steady wear on an already tattered relationship that held the black community and the Party of 
Lincoln together by only a few fraying threads.  A letter from Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr. of the 
San Diego Urban League written on June 2, 1980 to Gordon Luce, former Reagan California 
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cabinet member and state campaign coordinator, expressed frustration after he attended an event 
in which only he and his wife weren’t white: “I cannot help but feel alone in my support of the 
Republican Party.”151   
     Steadily losing minority support for decades, Republican candidates had long stopped trying 
very hard to court black voters, and the ideological divides between the two groups just kept 
growing wider. 152  This happened in part because many African Americans put a great deal more 
trust in federal authority than the private sector to address their specific concerns. Others felt like 
academics Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro: “Equal opportunity, even in the best of 
circumstances, does not lead to equality.”153 They purported, “without redistributing America’s 
wealth, [America] will not succeed in creating a more just society.”154  But this sort of 
positioning was anathema to Republican thinking.  Conservatives distrusted federal government 
to solve problems as much as blacks distrusted private enterprise, so it was very difficult to craft 
a message that would be appealing to both of them.   
     When debating Carter, Reagan still tried: “Yes, the President talks of government programs, 
and they have their place.  But as governor, when I was at that end of the line and receiving some 
of these grants for Government programs, I saw that so many of them were dead end.”155 Reagan 
wanted minorities to consider alternatives that led to greater opportunities for them to improve 	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their own economic positions.  However, when the moderator asked him in the same debate what 
he thought about the future of a multiracial society, Reagan seemed to have a tin ear: 
I believe in it.  I am eternally optimistic, and I happen to believe that we’ve made great 
progress from the days when I was young and when this country didn’t even know it had 
a racial problem.  I know those things can grow out of despair in an inner city, when 
there’s hopelessness at home, lack of work, and so forth.  But I… believe the Presidency 
is what Teddy Roosevelt said it was.  It’s a bully pulpit.  And I think that something can 
be done from there, because a goal for all of us should be that one day, things will be 
done neither because of nor in spite of any of the differences between us—ethnic 
differences or racial differences, whatever they may be—that we will have total 
opportunity for all people.  And I would do everything I could in my power to bring that 
about.156 
 
President Carter pounced on what he had heard as an insensitive gaff.  He observed, “I noticed 
that Governor Reagan said that when he was a young man that there was no knowledge of a 
racial problem in this country. Those who suffered from discrimination… certainly knew we had 
a racial problem.”157  
     Here Carter had pointed out the obvious.  Life for minorities in the United States could be 
very difficult in the early twentieth century.  How could anyone be ignorant of this fact?  Not 
long after becoming president, Reagan addressed this statement head-on when he told biographer 
Frank Van der Linden, “Some people in the campaign didn’t understand what I meant when I 
said I remember an era when we didn’t know we have a race problem.  We were accustomed to 
hearing everywhere, ‘Well, they’re fine, in their place.’  They could be talking about Catholics or 
Jews or blacks.”158   In other words, it was easy to move through life with little awareness of how 
racism impacted others in much the same way it might have been easy to move through life in 
Victorian Britain without acknowledging the stifling rigidity of class hierarchies.  Intolerance 	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was a pervasive social condition few whites thought much about.  One was born into a certain 
position, and this was simply the way it was. To think otherwise was ahistorical.   
      Even so, Reagan also recalled for Van der Linden the values on which he had been raised.  
His father, an Irish Catholic, despised the hate espoused by groups like the Ku Klux Klan to such 
an extent that Reagan—a Hollywood actor with an obvious interest in the evolution of film—
purposefully avoided ever seeing the iconic movie The Birth of a Nation.159  Jack and Nelle 
Reagan had taught their boys that perpetuation of negative myths or racial intolerance was 
nothing but ignorant and wrong.160  Therefore, when he was a student at Eureka College, Reagan 
volunteered to let two black football players including his close friend, William Franklin 
Burghardt, spend the night at his parents’ home where he knew they would be welcomed after 
they had been refused hotel rooms. Burghardt confirmed this incident to Lou Cannon of the 
Washington Post.  Burghardt added, “I just don’t think [Reagan] was conscious of race at all.... 
[In the Carter debate] Reagan said that when he was growing up they didn’t know they had a 
race problem.  It was the dumbest thing a grown person could say, but he’d never seen it.”161   
     Clearly, Reagan had seen how society could put people into boxes that were labeled in 
discriminatory ways, but he did not participate in such labeling.  Like Barry Goldwater, he 
personally opposed segregation—he publically spoke out against it as early as the nineteen-
thirties when he was a sportscaster in the Midwest—but even with his Irish Catholic surname, he 
had not had to think very often about how discrimination impacted others.162  As a white man 
who had been born in 1911, he had lived in a society that segregated experiences as well as 	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people, which inevitably led to a form of tunnel vision.163  Indeed, Reagan committed an early 
kerfuffle over American stereotyping in his 1980 bid for the Republican nomination.  
     Despite entering the race as the frontrunner, the Gipper’s campaign was beset from the start 
with debilitating internal divisions.  These would eventually lead to a change in campaign 
management team.164  Before that happened, George H. W. Bush would unexpectedly come out 
on top in the Iowa caucus, and the outcome of the New Hampshire primary would be 
unnervingly uncertain.  With his prospects looking momentarily dim—his political career close 
to being completely derailed by a poor campaign strategy—Reagan tried to lighten the mood 
with his staffers by telling a joke in front of several reporters: “How do you tell the Polish one at 
a cockfight?  He’s the one with the duck.  How do you tell the Italian?  He’s the one who bets on 
the duck.  How do you tell when the Mafia is there?  The duck wins.”165  For this lapse in taste, 
Reagan was widely condemned in the media. With offense that either bordered on the absurd or 
showed an especially dry sense of humor, the President of Yale—whose surname was 
Giamatti—released a statement published in the Boston Globe:  “There seems to be a lot of idle 
time in the Reagan campaign – idle time that apparently allows the candidate to tell ethnic jokes 
that mock our fellow citizens… I think he owes everybody an apology, including the ducks.”166   
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     Yet the same level of offense expressed by this representative of the elite intelligentsia did not 
flower within the general public no matter how many seeds of outrage the media planted.  In a 
March 1, 1980 internal staff memo, Governor Reagan was informed that the campaign had 
received a total of twelve letters and mailgrams from voters taking a position on the matter.  Not 
all of these were negative either.  One note read: “Dear Ron: I want you to know that even 
though I’m ½ Italian, only ½ of me is mad at you.  The other half says you’re still No. 1 in my 
book.”167  Another said, “I thought your joke was funny as hell, and I’m Italian.  My wife 
thought it was funny also, but what does she know?  She’s Polish.  Shows you have a good sense 
of humor.”168  
     Reagan would also receive at this time an interesting letter from Ted Kessler, Director of 
Management Services at St. Charles Hospital in Ohio.  It began: “Being aware of some 
continuing distortions regarding the ethnic joke incident, [I was reminded] of an instance early in 
your career, long before any civil rights movement, that demonstrated your attitude and 
principles toward racial fairness.”  Kessler recalled how he had created a raffle at the General 
Electric Jet Engine Plant in Cincinnati, Ohio to reward employees by allowing someone in his 
department to win a “night-on-the-town” with the actor Ronald Reagan after an employee dance.  
Since some “Supper Clubs” in Ohio were segregated in the mid-nineteen-fifties, the committee 
had proposed to move the event to a venue at which all the employees, regardless of race, would 
have an equal chance to participate.  Reagan was contacted to make certain he did not have any 
personal objections.  “To say the least, I was extremely pleased with your unequivocal response 
that either setting was perfectly acceptable to you.  Our black employees were delighted…. This 	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little known incident twenty-five years ago I am certain is matched by other acts of 
understanding long before it became popular to do so.”169   
      Kessler had reminded Reagan of what really amounted to only a small gesture, but this was a 
revealing incident all the same.  Per the social customs of the period, few white people would 
have remembered Reagan objecting to having to spend time socializing with blacks.  If Reagan 
had felt blacks were beneath him, he could have said so then when it would have cost him 
nothing.  It is reasonable to assume—as Ted Kessler did—that’s not the way Ronald Reagan ever 
felt.  That was also not the message he wished to project to voters.  He took the time to 
personally draft a thank you note to tell Mr. Kessler he appreciated the words of encouragement:  
“I must admit, they touch a nerve when they attack me on something like that story because I 
was brought up to detest prejudice or bigotry….”170  
     Regardless, Reagan was able to regain his position as frontrunner in the Granite State, and his 
team swaggered down South with high hopes for winning Dixie.171  Yet in South Carolina, the 
most important Southern Republican senator did not endorse the Gipper in the primary.  “Big 
Strom” aligned instead with Governor “Big John” Connally, another once Southern Democrat 
who had switched parties during the Nixon administration. 172  A young political strategist named 
Lee Atwater, who had cut his teeth in politics working for Senator Thurmond, decided to throw 
his weight behind Reagan. When Haley Barbour, head of the Mississippi Republican Party and a 
Reagan supporter in 1976 followed Strom’s lead, he tried to influence Atwater to jump to the 	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Connally ship. Even under pressure, Lee declined because he felt Reagan would prove the better 
candidate in the long run.173  This early judgment showed good instincts.   
     To get onto the Reagan campaign, Atwater leaned on his relationship with Carroll 
Campbell—a rising politician from the Palmetto State—who then agreed to be the chair for 
Reagan’s South Carolina effort if Atwater could serve as his manager.174   At that time, the future 
head of the RNC was still in in his twenties, still making his name in the ranks of hard-nosed 
professional consultants who often acted like Southern football coaches in front of the press: 
fiercely loyal to a team when wearing that team’s jersey, worshipped alongside players when 
delivering wins, completely disposable when racking up losses, and always open to new 
contracts that contained the potential for professional gains.  In the 2008 biopic Boogieman: The 
Life of Lee Atwater, journalist and professor Eric Alterman observed, “Isn’t it a shame that 
[Atwater] didn’t decide to become a Democrat because it would have been just as easy for him.  
He didn’t really believe in any of those things…. He liked politics because he could kick the 
other guy’s ass.”175   
     Though he once told a journalist he was intent on winning “to show the Harvard crowd that a 
redneck from South Carolina could come out on top,” Atwater was probably more committed to 
his party’s principles than Alterman has allowed. 176  He is buried beneath a truncated version of 
the South Carolina Republican Party’s creed. 177  But Alterman’s implication that Atwater was 
but a hired hand means he should never be confused with any of the long line of candidates he 	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promoted.  The observation that Atwater played his game hard—which was the way political 
consultants are expected to play when the stakes are the nation’s corridors of power—is entirely 
accurate and led to Atwater’s deserved reputation as “the Babe Ruth of negative politics.”178  
     An early experience that shaped Atwater’s strategic thinking was had when driving the man 
who was his mentor to the 1972 Republican National Convention.  Their car got stalled within 
the midst of “a demonstration of peaceniks” that blocked the road.  Unfazed by the angry crowd, 
Senator Strom Thurmond decided to get out of the car and was immediately confronted by a 
young woman who denounced him as a “fascist pig” and a “cocksucker.”  As she continued to 
curse him—and the television crews continued filming—Thurmond smiled at her and said things 
like, “Little girl, do your parents know you’re out here?  Honey, you sure are a pretty little 
thing.”  When the senator got back in the car some time later, Atwater asked him what in the 
world he had been thinking or doing.  Thurmond calmly explained, “Young man, that’ll be 
twenty-five thousand votes when we get home.”179 
     Another thing that Atwater learned in South Carolina’s political swamp was how to 
sometimes walk through the minefield that was race and blow up an opponent.  During the 1980 
primary, South Carolina was widely recognized as John Connally’s last chance to show he could 
inspire support apart from his oil field-owning friends back in the Lone Star state where he had 
been the governor when JFK was assassinated.180  But NBC correspondent Ken Bode reported 
on Jane Pauley’s March 7 NBC newscast that there was a charge from the Bush campaign that 
“John Connally offered 70,000 dollars in walking around money to black ministers: election day 
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cash for black votes.”181  As had been the case for multiple decades, African Americans voted 
overwhelmingly for Democrats in general elections, but there was the possibility that they could 
influence the open primary if they cast their support to either of the Texans.  Harry Dent—a 
Nixon operative who had orchestrated the 1970 debacle in which the Republican “Southern 
strategy” proved bankrupt—served as Bush’s South Carolina campaign chairman.182  Dent 
claimed he had a black witness who swore she had seen black ministers counting Connally’s 
money in the back of a church.  
     Whether it was made out of whole cloth or not, it is not hard to surmise this sensational story 
was circulated for the benefit of those rural Democrats the Bush team wanted to rile with racial 
hostility to go to the polls and neutralize Strom Thurmond’s endorsement of Connally.  
Whatever his role in the dissemination of this rumor—and he did play a role according to Lee 
Bandy, a political writer for the most important newspaper in South Carolina at that time—Lee 
Atwater would have certainly understood the racial maneuverings of Bush’s strategist Harry 
Dent whom Time magazine had once called a “Southern fried Rasputin in the Nixon 
Administration.”183  Any outrage at such “dirty tricks”—as Atwater had publically expressed—
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was also surely feigned.184  But Atwater’s “boogieman” persona, which is often credited with 
single-handedly elevating negative campaigning to the national stage, is unwarranted.185     
     Consider James Carville, political guru of the Left, has written with admiration about 
campaigns in Rome in which a candidate for consul’s brother advised, “go negative early, even 
bringing up the character issue: it must be easier to do when your appointment is a murderer [or] 
child molester.”186  Historian Charles O. Lerche, Jr. has observed, “appeals to naked prejudice 
and crass selfishness” have been rampant in every American political contest since 1796.  
Thomas Jefferson himself was accused of defrauding a widow out of her land, sleeping with a 
slave, liking the French, and being a Godless heathen.187  As Armstrong Williams—a black 
legislative analyst for whom Atwater opened doors to the Reagan White House—explained: 
“Politics is brutal.  It’s ruthless.  It leaves a lot of debris along the way.”188  And like every other 
campaign consultant working at his level for either party for centuries, Lee Atwater could be 
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dispassionately ruthless. 189  To think otherwise is naïve.  He viewed himself as a general for his 
party, perhaps like Sherman on a perpetual march to the sea, engaged in total warfare.190   
     Yet Ronald Reagan won the South Carolina primary in which Atwater was involved by 
simply and effectively positioning John Connally—who came from a New Deal tradition of big 
government spending—as a candidate who was too economically liberal to represent the interests 
of South Carolinians.191  Reagan had performed well at the University of South Carolina debate 
moderated by NPR’s Jim Lehrer, just as Lee Atwater had predicted he would.192  When asked 
about the participation of African Americans in the GOP, Reagan had also not given a 
demagogic answer aimed at resurrecting Jim Crow.  Rather, he had reiterated what he had said in 
other states across the country: “We’re Americans… with the same hopes and dreams….  We 
want [blacks] to have [opportunity], and we believe the Republicans offer that more than the 
Democrats do.”193  Ronald Reagan’s campaign was not Barry Goldwater’s campaign or Richard 
Nixon’s 1970 midterms.  Rather than trying to leverage regions to win electoral votes, it was 
built on a consistently national strategy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Robin Toner, “Washington at Work: The New Spokesman for the Republicans: A Tough Player in a Rough 
Arena,” New York Times, July 31, 1990.  Roger Ailes described the personalities that translated into the professional 
styles of two of the most well known political consultants who eventually led the RNC.  The first, Charlie Black, 
was fired from Reagan’s team in 1980 and then rehired again in 1984.  The second is Lee Atwater:  “Charlie’s the 
kind of guy who if he came home and found somebody making out with his wife on a rainy day, he’d break the 
guy’s umbrella and ask him to leave, then have him killed a year later.  Lee would blow the house up.”	  190	  John Brady, Bad Boy: The Life and Politics of Lee Atwater (Reading: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 
1997), 316.  “Like a good general, I had treated everyone who wasn’t with me as against me.”  The quote is from the 
controversial interview Atwater gave to Life magazine while wracked with cancer.  Perhaps his opponents viewed 
him this way as well. On his death day, Ron Brown had the flag flown at half-mast at the Democratic National 
Committee. 
191 Ibid., 77-78. 
192 Richard J. Cattani, “South Carolina’s Primary: John Connally’s Waterloo?” The Christian Science Monitor, 
February 8, 1980, accessed March 2, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0208/020842.html Lee Atwater said, 
"Sure, the debate will help us. Some say Reagan's afraid to debate after he didn't in the Iowa campaign, or he's too 
old to do well against younger men. This will dispel all that.” 
193 Craig Shirley, Rendezvouz with Destiny: Ronald Reagan and the Campaign that Changed America (Wilmington: 
ISI Books, 2009), 182. 
	   52	  
     Additionally, Lee Atwater’s role in shaping Reagan’s bid for the presidency should not be 
aggrandized.  Stuart Spencer who had worked as a political consultant both for and against the 
Gipper in multiple campaigns was part of Reagan’s inner circle.194  He once commented, “I don’t 
remember what Lee did for the Reagan campaign.  Something in the South.”195  Though he 
would become a deputy for Ed Rollins who managed Reagan’s 1984 campaign, Atwater 
remained only a minor player in the Office for Political Affairs during Reagan’s first term.  
Strom Thurmond had called Reagan’s new chief-of-staff James Baker to help get Lee that job 
after the election was over, and Lyn Nofziger extended an offer only when Atwater assured him 
he could keep “liar politics out of the White House.”196  As Robert Novak has said, “In the 
Reagan administration, they didn’t take [Atwater] seriously.  He was a guy on the make.”197  
     In these circumstances, Atwater was probably quite happy to take some time to talk politics 
“off the record” with Alexander Lamis from Case Western Reserve University in 1981.  Atwater 
was as ambitious as a politician, but he also nursed a secret desire to one day teach practical 
politics on a college campus.198  The resulting interview would become infamous, and some 
doubted it even existed until Lamis’s widow released the actual audio to James Carter IV in 
2012.  An Obama donor, she said her driving motivation was that she wanted the world to know 
that her husband’s reasons for quoting Atwater were always “scholarly, not political.”199 If she 
was sincere, it is most ironic that only a few incendiary sentences from less than two minutes of 
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verbiage from a forty-two minute long recording are most often repeated with no context ever 
added for the general public.  One must wonder if anyone but scholars bother to listen to—or 
actually analyze—the entirety of what Lee Atwater said.  It is difficult to surmise that his words 
have been anything but politicized.    
     Regardless, the main thrust of the 1981 interview was to examine voting trends in the South 
after the New Deal.  Atwater asserted race became a primary political issue in the region for 
obvious reasons in 1954.  Race would continue to be a primary focus for a generation and would 
prompt the exploitive Harry Dent style “Southern strategy” tried in 1970 on the heels of Kevin 
Phillips’ Emerging Republican Majority. However, by then, aligning with segregationists was 
not a winning proposition.  The country itself had moderated its stance on race, and this 
moderation had extended into the South.200  By 1980, the dominant issues that moved voters to 
the polls had been completely transformed again into a new (old) focus on the economy and 
national defense: a Goldwater platform that was uncorrupted this time around by the taint of 
Southern racism.  To illustrate the point, Reagan ran on the foundational issues, which had first 
launched him into politics in 1964 minus “…obviously the Voting Rights Act, the TVA, and all 
that bullshit… The South went from being behind the times to being mainstream.”201  Atwater 
further posited all vestiges of a Southern strategy with coded racial appeals had been phased out 
as the race issue had been resolved legislatively and was no longer on the minds of most whites. 
The fact that the Connally “buying black votes” scandal existed is an instance that refutes this 
Atwater assertion.  Republicans sometimes still deployed the “race card” when convenient.  But 
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Atwater’s analysis that the South had been forced to structurally change, and thus Southerners 
themselves had adjusted to a new social reality, was supported by the focus on larger 
conservative issues in the 1980 campaign that resonated more than race with white Southerners.   
     When Lamis pushed Atwater on the existence of “residual” racist sentiment to which 
politicians still appealed when using “code words” via issues like busing, law and order, welfare 
reform, etc., Atwater talked about polling that showed that these matters had deflated 
considerably in importance and were no longer animated at the root by racism.  He asserted 
resentments between groups had become more class-based than race-based and were thus 
colorblind.  As he had explained,  “You could sit in a cocktail party anywhere… and you’d hear, 
‘I’m tired of these fuckers getting welfare,’ and if [any of those fuckers] were a white, it 
wouldn’t make any difference…. My generation… your and my generation… will be the first 
generation of Southerners that won’t be prejudiced.”202     
      Even so, Atwater also recognized there were blue-collar and lower class whites who had 
once been easily swayed by racism—and who were still swayed by racism—because they felt the 
most economically threatened by blacks.   They were the Wallace voters, and by 1976 they 
belonged to Jimmy Carter.  But even these voters also cared about issues that genuinely stood 
apart from—and could trump—racial antipathies by the 1980 contest.  These issues included a 
desire for a strong defense, an evangelical religious ethos, regional pride, and a strong sense of 
self-reliance.  In other words, multiple core values remained viable issues for Republicans to use 
to campaign to this demographic when racism was thrown out the electoral pot.   
     Lamis pushed again for Atwater to make race more prominent in the discussion of how 
Reagan might have won the South, so restating in much cruder terms what he’d already 
essentially communicated, Atwater said:   	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You start out in 1954 by saying nigger, nigger, nigger.  By 1968 you can’t say nigger.  
That hurts you.  Backfires.  So you say stuff like, well, forced busing, states’ rights, and 
all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and 
all of these things you’re talking about are totally economic things, and a byproduct of 
this is blacks get hurt worse than whites, and subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I’m 
not saying it, but I’m saying that if it is getting that abstract and that coded, uh, that we’re 
doing away with the racial problem one way or the other, uh, you follow me?  Cause 
obviously sitting around saying we want to cut taxes, we want to cut this, is much more 
abstract than even the bussing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than nigger, 
nigger, you know, so any way you look at it, race is coming on the back burner.203     
 
In other words, in 1954 the most important issue in the South was race, which was predicated on 
blatant appeals to pervasive racism.  Many politicians—and most campaign consultants—took 
this into account when running campaigns.  However, the society was forced to change, so the 
political culture slowly changed, too, until blatant appeals to racists no longer worked for 
politicians.  “Coded language” was then used via a George Wallace/Harry Dent style Southern 
strategy in 1968/1970 to mean racist things until those “codes” eventually became so watered 
down with “abstracts” that the “racism” was diluted right out of the concepts.  People started to 
have different concerns about politics in any case, and these concerns were no longer tied to 
maintaining the color divide, which was done and gone.  Cutting taxes was what percolated most 
in 1980.  Race—which had once been the main ingredient used to get passions boiling—was 
pushed onto the back burner.  
     Additionally, Atwater talked specifically about the impact of economic change in the South.  
Unfortunately, some “abstracts” like the fairness of reducing tax rates hurt minority communities 
disproportionately because poor blacks depended to a higher degree on government assistance 
than anyone else. Though there were some whites that may have been “subconsciously” happy 
with this reality, the essential difference to note—a distinction Atwater made in the greater 
interview—is that in political days past the black community was targeted for harm.  But more 	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than a quarter of a century beyond Brown v. Board, resentment over redistribution was 
determined by whether or not a person paid his taxes, not the color of his skin.  This was cultural 
evolution.  Atwater felt even middle-class blacks would eventually fit into the Republican 
coalition.  In any case, the old Wallace voter who was most influenced by race and who still 
ruled local government as Democrats in the South in 1981 could (and would) be phased out 
incrementally.204  
     Of course, when Andrew Rosenthal quoted in an editorial for The New York Times only the 
“nigger, nigger, nigger” paragraph of the Atwater interview the day after The Nation first 
published the audio on-line—which, incidentally, had the “nigger, nigger, nigger” segment of the 
audio conveniently extracted and highlighted at the top of The Nation page—there was no 
mention of any of these broader points, no scholastic discussion of political science or the 
realities of campaign strategizing, which was the type of thing in which Atwater was 
forthrightly—albeit crassly—engaging.  Instead, Rosenthal asserted when the Right bristled in 
the Obama years at accusations that conservatives used “dog whistle” politics that only people in 
Dixie could hear, they had been proven to be equivocating because in 1981 a still minor player 
outside of South Carolina named Lee Atwater had shown “manipulating the racial fears, ethnic 
resentments and xenophobia of some American voters is the warp and woof of the modern 
Republican party.”205    
     Rick Perlstein has also asserted that Lee Atwater had been acting in bad faith—had been 
trying to establish Republican racial innocence—when purporting to Lamis that “people in the 	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South are just like any people in the history of the world” adapting to changed circumstances.206  
Preferring a Southern exceptionalist narrative, Perlstein purported race is more of an issue in 
establishing voting habits in the twenty-first century South than it had been—apparently—during 
the Civil Rights Era.   To come to this conclusion, Perlstein leaned on scholars Valentino and 
Sears who have advanced the “Southerners-are-racists” trope by embracing the idea that “a new 
form of racism” currently determines twenty-first century Southerners’ party allegiances.207  
(Southerners are racists.  Southerners are Republicans.  Republicans are racists.)   
     Perlstein has embraced this belief despite the fact that respected “principled ideology” 
theorists and “group conflict” theorists take different positions than the “symbolic racism 
theorists” like Valentino and Sears when attempting to understand the role of anti-black affect 
within a complex, modern political context.208  Reducing political motives to race is always 
tricky, but a study conducted by Paul M. Sniderman and Edward H. Stiglitz in conjunction with 
the 2008 presidential election showed that negative attitudes about race profoundly influenced 
the voting choices of Democrats while any measurably “negative attitudes toward blacks had no 
significant influence among [the voting choices of] Republicans.”209   
     If that is true, it is easier to understand why Lee Atwater is highlighted to the degree that he is 
in 2014.  He is part of the “racist Republican” construct.  He has remained an effective “boogie 
man” for Democrats.  It is also easier to understand why Andrew Young, a former Carter UN 	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Ambassador and surrogate, attempted to manipulate racial fears, ethnic resentments and the 
xenophobia of voters as part of a Democratic Southern strategy designed to profit from the racial 
resentment and fear of blacks.   In the heat of the 1980 election, Mr. Young said Ronald Reagan 
had telegraphed to the country “it’s going to be all right to kill niggers when he’s president.”210   
     This message was not abstract or coded in any way.   
 
CHAPTER THREE:  SOUTHERN STRATEGIES 
     There are wounds within the American body politic that Kevin Phillips described in his book 
The Emerging Republican Majority.  Phillips posited ethnic, cultural and racial divisions are 
deeply felt in the United States, and politicians who understand how to manipulate these 
divisions win elections.211  For suggesting such, Phillips was called “an insensitive Neanderthal 
with almost sadistic social concepts,” but his rationale reveals what many have always believed 
to be the realities of practical politics.212  Yet some say Ronald Reagan took his campaigning 
cues from Phillips and sacrificed black voters on the altar of Southern whites for political gain. 
To determine if this is true, it is necessary to do two things: look at Reagan’s record on issues 
that mattered to minorities leading up to the 1980 campaign (and beyond) in more depth as well 
as examine specific charges that he exploited race to win votes.  One should also question how 
Democratic reactions to Reagan, which have shown elements of Phillips’ “divide and conquer” 
strategy, might have shaped the president’s legacy outside of his base of supporters.  (If Ronald 
Reagan pandered to whites in his first successful bid for the White House, Jimmy Carter pressed 
hard on the deeply felt scars of blacks in a desperate attempt to retain political advantage.)  	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     First, it is undeniable many in the African American community viewed Reagan as he was 
running for president in 1980 with deep suspicion.  As a private citizen, he had opposed very 
important civil rights legislation in the 1960s.  He had objected to any federal laws—including 
civil rights laws—that he viewed as disruptive to free enterprise.213  Though these objections 
were predicated on “the Lockean notion that any gain of government came at the expense of 
freedom” rather than a desire to maintain segregation, the Republican Party’s inevitable alliance 
via the Goldwater faction with Southerners who clearly were interested in maintaining the color 
line “opened a gulf between conservatives and blacks that has never healed.”214 Additionally, 
Reagan told journalist Laurence I. Barrett “that the 1965 Voting Rights Act had been 
‘humiliating to the South,’” and he “was opposed to [it] from the beginning” as he found the 
selective application of law enforcement particularly “vindictive.”215  This may have been true, 
but this attitude did not win Reagan any fans amongst black voters who had long been humiliated 
by selective voting laws that had discriminated against them. 
     Fast-forward fifty years to 2014 and one can easily say Reagan’s positions on civil rights in 
the 1960s were flawed. Codified discrimination had clearly crippled the ability of minorities to 
enjoy the civil liberties to which they were entitled, and action needed to be taken by the 
government to correct the untenably tilted playing field it had, in part, created.  However, 
reducing Reagan’s position in any debate about complicated legislation—even necessary 
legislation—to short sentence critiques that carry implications of racial antipathies is both 
ahistorical and unfair.  Though racism was, indeed, at the root of much of the uproar in the 
South, the undermining of some freedoms and the potential for unintended consequences—	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especially in regard to vague language in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—were the things 
to which Republicans like Reagan objected.216  To be sure, by the end of Ronald Reagan’s first 
term as president, approximately “70 percent of the American population [was] entitled to 
preferential treatment under ‘affirmative action’” initiatives that sprang out of early civil rights 
legislation.217  Statistics like these undergirded Reagan’s case when he spoke in 1985 about those 
in American society who, “in the name of equality, would have [the government] practice 
discrimination.”218  They continue to resonate today as some race-defined groups still push 
against other race-defined groups over issues like equal treatment in college admissions.219  
Therefore, it seems the honest observer might concede it was possible in 1964—as it is possible 
today—to have a very principled argument about which were the best ways to maintain 
appropriate balances between citizens’ “civil liberties,” which are inalienable and “civil rights,” 
which are not, without being accused of engaging with racism or pandering to racists. 220 This is 
true even though one must also concede Goldwater made an alliance with Southerners who were 
interested in the power of states’ rights purely to preserve segregation.      
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      Even so, attitudes about how to properly rectify the wrongs of institutionalized racism are 
constantly evolving in the United States and should be evaluated in context.  Consider LBJ 
himself built his early political career on opposing civil rights legislation.  Not only did he water 
down President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1957 Civil Rights Bill in the Senate, in 1948 the Texas 
Congressman called President Harry Truman’s civil rights initiatives “a farce and a sham—an 
effort to set up a police state in the guise of liberty.”221  Often crass, President Johnson also 
frequently bantered with words that do not seem to have ever been a part of Reagan’s vocabulary 
and that might suggest a feeling of strong personal animosity towards blacks.222  As with most 
large initiatives that come from Washington, there was a self-serving element of political 
calculation involved in LBJ’s decision to capitalize upon Kennedy’s death to push forward a 
civil rights agenda that tracked closely with the changing mood of the public outside Johnson’s 
native South.223  None of this changes the fact that the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 
Voting Rights Act did a great deal of good for African Americans living in the United States, but 
it calls into question the wisdom of judging any politician with a long career in the public eye on 
early positions rather than on his or her defining actions.    
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     If concerned more by what Ronald Reagan did when in power rather than what Ronald 
Reagan said as a private citizen, he signed the 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendment.  Of course, 
like related laws, this legislation was very complex with substantial controversies swirling 
around its passage.  Though there were still abuses within some state electoral systems that 
ultimately made the amendment necessary for minorities to better join the political mainstream, 
elected legislators—and the administration—had another vigorous debate about the wisdom of 
signaling “a major departure in the Nation’s understanding of ‘equality,’ [that might transform] 
the focus of analysis for the first time from the individual citizen to the collective racial or ethnic 
group.”224  By affixing his signature to the legislation, Reagan effectively conceded there are 
times in which it is appropriate to look at the bigger, societal picture.  Never an ideologue, he 
said, “There are differences over how to attain the equality we seek for all our people…. But 
actions speak louder than words.  This legislation proves our unbending commitment to voting 
rights.”225   
     Additionally, when asked directly by Robert Scheer, who interviewed Reagan in 1980, if he 
would still oppose the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Reagan indicated he had changed his initial 
position “because [he recognized] now that [racism] is institutionalized and [the Civil Rights 
Act] has, let’s say, has hastened the solution of a lot of problems.” 226  Apparently unimpressed, 
Scheer wrote the former governor “was still against the [forced] desegregation of neighborhoods 
and affirmative action; and surely having one black friend from college football days [would] not 
solve the [civil rights] problems….  [Additionally, Reagan had created] fewer than 2,000 jobs in 
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a state that [had] 40 percent black-youth unemployment… [and] 20,000,000 people.”227 Many 
shared Scheer’s skepticism, and the issues he raised should be examined in brief.     
     Reagan’s beliefs in private property rights were at the root of his opposition to forced 
neighborhood integration and the Rumford Act in 1963, which was aimed at stopping property 
owners from engaging in blatant discrimination.228  In the early sixties, open housing laws were 
routinely crushed across the country—“even in supposedly liberal Berkeley”—whenever they 
were proposed by local governments.229  When riots broke out in Watts and other urban centers 
outside the South, opposition to such laws became further entrenched, and voters who felt 
legitimately threatened by a social upheaval they had neither foreseen nor understood in the 
wake of civil rights legislation revolted politically.  This was the “white backlash” to which 
many historians like Rick Perlstein and Kevin Krus have devoted much attention.  Like most 
mass phenomena, this backlash was not driven by a single factor, but segregation and racism that 
existed outside the South nursed its growth.230   
     Still, Ronald Reagan maintained, “[Opposition to fair housing laws] has nothing to do with 
discrimination.  It has to do with our freedom, our basic freedom.”231  When Reagan was actually 
elected governor in 1967, he would take a conservative’s approach to combatting racism in real 
estate by trying to change California culture outside the cudgel of top-down mandate.  For 
example, he recognized that the California Real Estate Association had no black members, so he 
directed Bob Karpe, his Real Estate Commissioner, to gradually desegregate the real estate 
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industry by folding minority realtors into a new CREA that pushed a “color-blind” ethos.232  He 
also chartered three minority-owned banks in cities with minority populations to generate 
minority loans to grant greater access to better housing.233  Additionally, he tried to empower 
individuals by increasing their ability to earn more money. 
     On this, his civil services reforms had minority workers specifically in mind.  Instead of 
retaining written tests for licensing, which often required a certain kind of education to complete 
well, Reagan pushed for actual skills testing, which allowed trade workers to demonstrate what 
they could do rather than what they could write about doing.   This was because Reagan had 
discovered “virtually the only blacks employed by the state were janitors or those working in 
other menial positions, largely because state civil service tests were slanted against them.”234  
Showing ideological flexibility when attempting to rectify racial disparities, Reagan also 
introduced affirmative action into state hiring practices in 1971 when he signed Executive Order 
No. R-34-71.235  “As a result… the number of minorities who were a part of the state system… 
workforce increased over the Reagan years.”236  Perhaps all of these efforts were innately 
inadequate to redress black living conditions or increase black employment—especially in a state 
as large as California—but President Reagan would sign a bill in 1988 that levied punitive fines 
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on anyone still engaging in flagrant discrimination in the real estate sector, which strengthened 
the essentially toothless Civil Rights Act of 1968.237  
     Back to 1980, Robert Scheer also noted as many other Republican critics would that he had 
not seen any appreciable minority following for Reagan at any of the events he had covered on 
the campaign trail.238  Per this point, black loyalties had been consolidated within the Democratic 
Party for decades, and some of Reagan’s ideas about states’ rights and the positions he had taken 
on civil rights felt incompatible with—if not downright antithetical to—black interests.   At one 
point on the road, Reagan spotted a sign in the crowd that read “Blacks for Reagan.”  This 
prompted him to pause and say, “God bless those who brought that sign, and, by golly, it shows 
that you can’t fool all the people all of the time.”239  The fact that this sign was so notable to the 
candidate—was so rare at a rally as to catch his eye—suggests just how unpopular Reagan must 
have truly been with African Americans.  This was true even though the 1980 Republican 
National Convention was held in Detroit, Michigan specifically to combat a WASPish 
Republican brand that seemed to scream racial exclusivity.  On a symbolic level, Reagan had 
been meant to stand in the Motor City as a clear alternative to the status quo of liberal rule that 
had not served blacks well.240  Yet when he prepared to finally claim his party’s nomination, the 
Gipper may have missed a chance to drive this point home as he was more focused on who 
would be his running mate than he was focused on minority outreach.   
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     On this point, one might recall in February 1975 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., 
conservative activists had tried to convince Reagan to run on a third party “dream ticket” with 
George Wallace.241  Refusing to make such an alliance—despite the urging of Kevin Phillips—
Reagan had maintained he had “certain philosophical differences” with the former governor of 
Alabama that were insurmountable.242  Dewey Burton, the New York Time’s face for blue-collar 
men who jumped primaries, said Reagan won his support then because the ex-actor was the 
image of “freshness, independence, backbone, and scrappy spirit that Wallace had shown in 1972 
but ‘without the shadow of racism behind him.’”243 When speculation turned to a new “dream 
ticket” in 1980, no one even mentioned George, the Democrat.  There was talk instead of an 
unconventional union with President Gerald Ford that collapsed at the last minute.  Despite a 
contentious relationship with Reagan during the primary season, a moderate from Texas ended 
up accepting the position of VP candidate.244  Then Reagan and George H. W. Bush flew to 
Houston to take their wives to “a rally that marked the first public campaign appearance of the 
Republican ticket.” 245  This is important to note because many scholars and journalists persist in 
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saying Reagan opened his general campaign in Mississippi.246  This is simply not true.  The 
official launch would not happen until Labor Day.247  But the first campaign event revolved 
around Reagan’s need to unite different factions within his own party.  He did this by tipping his 
cowboy hat to Bush’s home state: “If Texas and California can’t [beat Carter], it can’t be 
done.”248  
     Reagan had also not forgotten about his desire to pull minorities into his campaign.  Though 
internal polling data showed that Reagan had literally no chance of winning a meaningful 
segment of blacks to his cause, the Atlanta Daily World advised its predominantly black readers 
to not be duped by “the efforts of some writers in the white press to give the impression that 
former Gov. Reagan has written off the Negro vote.”249  Reagan was making efforts to reach out, 
but these efforts were often clumsy.  For example, NAACP President Benjamin Hooks was 
invited to address the Republican Convention in Detroit in part because Reagan was criticized 
for missing the NAACP convention in Miami.250  Hooks then “argued that ‘laissez-faire’ and 
‘trickle down’ solutions would not resolve the economic crisis” for poor blacks.251  Though he 
was warmly received, this presentation gave another glimpse at a serious ideological divide 	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between conservatives and minorities.  If “the GOP’s biggest potential black constituency was 
the product of governmental actions designed to counter the traditional discriminatory practices 
of the free market and to redistribute income and opportunity”—a view Hooks seemed to 
advocate in his speech—Reagan’s smaller government, lower taxes candidacy was doomed from 
the start to be seen as untenable.252   
     Furthermore, conservative ideology born from opposition to the New Deal simply rejected or 
disparaged much of the redistributive liberal vision that had been most appealing to African 
Americans: guaranteed annual income, a national health service, public sector jobs, food stamps, 
and a minimum wage.253  Under Reagan’s leadership, the Republicans’ position to address class 
disparities was always full employment, not redistribution.254  He insisted any approach that 
made any group dependent on a federal program was both short sighted and unproductive.  
Addressing the N.A.A.C.P. in 1981, he said, “Government is no longer the draft horse of 
minority progress…. It is time we looked to new answers and new ways of thinking that will 
accomplish the very ends the New Deal and the Great Society anticipated.”255  This coldly 
received speech was an attempt to explain why his administration had pushed the House for 
massive cuts to various welfare programs that impacted minorities disproportionately in 
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Reagan’s first term.256  The reason for these cuts had been two-fold: to decrease dependence on 
government programs and to slash inflation.257  Reagan also supported a tightened monetary 
policy, which slayed the inflation beast but caused painful, short-term consequences.258   
     Some anti-capitalism scholars who have advocated socialism as the only way to achieve a just 
society viewed these practices within Reaganomics as racist attempts to conserve the position of 
a power elite “at the expense of blacks, Latinos, the working class and the poor.”259 Indeed, the 
national black unemployment rate spiked to 20.4% in 1982, but this number would drop to 
11.4% by the time Reagan left office, a substantive improvement for black families when 
compared to an almost 15% unemployment rate when Reagan first took control from Carter.260 
Furthermore, after the 1981-82 recession ended, “per capita real GNP or per capita real 
disposable income or per capita real consumption rose at rates of increase above those 
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experienced in the 1970s,” which coincided with “more than 65 percent of the potential labor 
force [being] employed for the first time….”261 Though not specifically targeting minorities, 
these were the rising tides that Reagan had always said would lift all boats, and if using such 
economic measures as guideposts, blacks were consequently better off at the end of Reagan’s 
tenure than they had been at the end of Carter’s.   
     Moreover, despite the very real dissonance that existed between the prevailing vision of 
blacks and the prevailing vision of conservatives, there were black conservatives who supported 
Reagan with points of view that should not be dismissed just because they were on his team.262  
James C. Cummings, Jr., Chairman of the National Black Republican Council, felt in 1980 that 
“the image of Governor Reagan, which [was] promoted among blacks by the Democrats, [was] 
not an accurate image….”263 He predicated this notion on Reagan’s actions in office.  For 
example, Governor Reagan had appointed an unprecedented number of blacks to important 
positions including James Johnson, his Director of Veterans’ Affairs, who was the first black to 
head a California state department.264  Melvin Bradley who served as Assistant to the Governor 
from 1970-1974 said, “The fact of the matter is that prior to Governor Reagan, there had never 
been more than a handful of blacks who participated in state government at almost any level….  
Almost every appointment that Governor Reagan made, as far as blacks are concerned, was a 
first.”265     
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     Even though Reagan never got a lot of credit from the majority of black voters for these 
endeavors, he had still planned to make his first major address after the 1980 Detroit Convention 
to the black community.  On an internal calendar dated June 13 from Ed Meese’s files stored in 
the Reagan Library—before Reagan had even become the official Republican nominee—there 
was a handwritten “OK” in bold blue ink next to “National Urban League” in the August 5th 
block.  Unfortunately, “Neshoba County Fair” appeared on the same calendar in the August 7th 
block. 266  Reagan would not travel to Mississippi per the date on this early schedule, but the 
nefarious symbolism that clouded Neshoba County meant it would have probably been better for 
Reagan’s image if the event had been canceled all together.  Certainly Reagan’s appearance there 
would undercut the work of Wright-McNeill, a black political consulting firm based in 
Columbus, Georgia, that had been hired by the RNC to analyze and conduct black outreach.  
Wright-McNeill had concluded the GOP could reach more black voters, but Reagan would need 
to pay special attention to articulation to persuade minorities to consider Republican principles 
that caused psychic discomfort.267  In light of this purpose, Reagan giving a speech near a city in 
which civil rights workers had been murdered was surely incoherent and counterproductive.   
      This was also the conclusion of an African American economist named Thomas Sowell who 
was asked to offer his opinions on Republican outreach efforts.  Sowell was not a Republican—
or even very political in 1980—but he agreed to go to Reagan’s Los Angeles office.  He met 
with two black staffers, one of whom Sowell has called “Mr. Skeptic” in his memoir.  Though on 
the same ideological page as Reagan, Mr. Skeptic “wondered how much [Reagan and his aides] 	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understood black voters or were comfortable with them.”268 When Sowell learned that Reagan 
planned to go to Philadelphia, Mississippi to speak at the Neshoba Fair, he was confounded and 
withdrew any official affiliation with the campaign—an affiliation that had lasted all of two 
days—because such a trip seemed breathtakingly wrongheaded.  Though he already felt Reagan 
was “a man of much more substance than he was usually credited with in the media—then or 
later,” Sowell viewed Mr. Skeptic’s instincts as having been validated.269   
     Regardless, on August 3, 1980, the Republican nominee started what was billed as a three-day 
campaign swing to woo black voters after a quick pit stop down South.270  On ABC’s World 
News Tonight, Joe Benton set the scene: “An estimated 30,000 people did their best to make 
Ronald and Nancy Reagan feel at home at the Neshoba County fair….  Republicans here say it is 
the most important event in the entire state between now and Election Day.”271 Much more 
would be made later of what the press described as a “10-minute speech” near a small town on a 
summer evening than would ever be made of what was the “major address” Reagan gave to the 
Urban League only a couple of days later.272   Blowback would come almost immediately from 
the Carter campaign, but some historians and liberal pundits continue to use Neshoba to tarnish 
Reagan’s reputation by suggesting he openly appealed to racists when running for office.   
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     For example, Thomas F. Schaller wrote in Whistling Past Dixie Reagan’s “race-themed 
event” in Mississippi capitalized on white backlash.  Reagan’s campaign strategists purposefully 
chose the rural platform for the candidate’s “first major speech after accepting the 1980 
Republican presidential nomination” to send a “clear signal that the GOP presidential ticket… 
would defend southern autonomy on racial issues.”273  For liberals like Schaller, Neshoba was 
such a powerful symbol that Reagan’s visit was meant to spark a fire brighter than a burning 
cross because “press coverage and word-of-mouth among white southerners [would quickly] 
spread Reagan’s coded racial messages across the region.”274   
     This is similar to the story Jimmy Carter’s surrogates would tell about Neshoba, but that was 
a matter of politics.  History is a different animal.  Schaller’s version of events is inaccurate on 
multiple points.  First, Reagan’s 1980 visit to Neshoba County Fair was not “race-themed.”  
Though most of the attendees were white, the fair itself could be called race-neutral.  Surely 
there were Confederate flags fluttering in the Mississippi breeze, but the attractions at the fair 
were politicians, family reunions, a hog calling championship, and the selection of Miss Neshoba 
County.275  Nor did Reagan mention race once in his speech.  Secondly, once the negative 
implications of the Neshoba appearance were clear, Reagan’s campaign strategists advised 
strongly against going.  Thirdly, the Gipper did not give a “major” speech.  Rather this was a 
short, humorous address that touched upon little of substance.  Fourth, there were, of course, 
racists in Mississippi including those KKK members who had shamefully murdered the civil 
rights activists in nearby Philadelphia in1964, which had forever tainted the geography with 
negative symbolism.  However, in general, no one was much concerned about Southern 	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autonomy on racial issues in 1980, and any “pride of place” as a “first” campaign event was 
wholly unintentional on Reagan’s part and not an accurate description of his schedule.   
     Per notes on a July 29th campaign calendar in Ed Meese’s papers, the Urban League Speech 
happening on August 5 was still slated before Reagan was supposed to speak in Neshoba 
County.276  However, Reagan’s disorganized campaign managers changed the date of Reagan’s 
appearance at the last minute to avoid sending the wrong signal to voters.  As one staffer 
explained, “It would have been like we were coming to Mississippi and winking at the folks 
here, saying we didn’t mean to be talking to them Urban League folk.”277  The desire was to not 
“wink” at anyone.  To be sure, an internal campaign memo to Reagan’s advance schedulers 
handwritten by Ken Klinge outlined chief pollster and strategist Dick Wirthlin’s four options for 
dealing with the potentially horrible optics of the fair.  These options were: cancel Neshoba all 
together and return to the South in mid-October; substitute George and Barbara Bush to make the 
appearance; change the date, or abandon the “urban affairs theme” of Reagan’s broader trip, 
which was the main purpose for this segment of his travel.278  Wirthlin also had a direct 
conversation with the candidate about how Neshoba might be negatively spun with racial 
overtones, which had made Reagan so angry he had thrown the papers in his hands across the 
room.  Having long viewed any charges of racism—or charges of appealing to racists—directed 
against him as nothing more than blatant attempts at character assassination, he had said, “Dick, 
I’ve already given a commitment on it.  I’m not going to disappoint those people.”279   
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     Lou Cannon has written that one of the reasons Reagan made this “stumble” was that he was 
very superstitious about ever breaking an engagement, but one should also note the campaign’s 
real “Southern strategy” had been to “recruit prominent surrogate speakers for Reagan from the 
South, especially Democrats from the state.”280  Breaking a commitment to Southern politicians 
over Neshoba might have sent the negative message that Reagan viewed the Southern people, 
her elected officials, and the region in general as the pariahs they were too often portrayed to be 
long after the civil rights movement had ended.  For an example of perpetuated “Southern racist” 
stereotyping persisting, one need only remember when school integration was finally a reality in 
Neshoba County in 1970, “the national media flocked to Philadelphia to watch the violence 
erupt; there was none.”281  Besides, Reagan’s strategists believed their candidate had a natural 
charm in the “New South” where the key to changing votes was economic dynamism “aided by 
themes stressing productivity, lower taxes, free enterprise, etc.”282 Reagan did not need to appeal 
to racists to attract support.   
     Additionally, though he would keep his word to attend the fair in 1980, the date of Reagan’s 
visit was switched on the calendar at the last minute per Wirthlin’s advice—the number three 
option on the aforementioned memo—to de-emphasize any unintended messaging that might be 
inscribed onto the venue by political enemies.  This was hoped to be enough of a defensive 
calculation because the fair was not Reagan’s first public outing since he had officially been 
named the Republican nominee in Detroit.  It was not even the first public event over which he 	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had presided that weekend.  Just the night before flying to Mississippi, Reagan spoke in Irvine, 
California for a similar length of time as he would speak at the Neshoba Fairgrounds.  He had 
been an honored guest presiding over the United States Long Course Swimming Championship 
that would determine who would have made the country’s Olympic Team if American athletes 
had been allowed to compete at the official games in Moscow.283  
     Once Reagan was on stage in Mississippi at what multiple publications called a “traditional 
political forum” where candidates jockeying for Southern voters had been appearing for almost 
one hundred years, the Republican candidate did not launch into a formal or race-themed 
address. 284  Rather he referenced great Southern traditions like Old Miss football.  He mentioned 
his good friend John Wayne.  He joked about Nancy in the rocking chair she’d been given by 
their hosts along with a basket made by Choctaw Indians, early residents of Philadelphia.   He 
kept the crowd laughing with lines like, “I know Jimmy Carter has been doing his best; that’s the 
problem,” and “I know why [Teddy Kennedy is] so interested in poverty: he never had any when 
he was a kid.”285  Far from playing the role of race-baiter with a George Wallace flair for 
insinuation, Reagan introduced some of his more serious core beliefs to the crowd as casually as 
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a guy talking on a front porch drinking lemonade.  He said the common stereotype of lazy people 
on welfare was wrong because he knew after having been a governor of a major state that “the 
overwhelming majority [of people receiving public aid] would like nothing better than to be out 
with jobs for the future.”286 Therefore, one can assume if “welfare” was—as has often been 
contended by the Left—a white backlash “code word,” Reagan did not deploy it well in Neshoba 
County.287  Rather than stirring up racial resentment, he was clearly calling for compassion for 
fellow citizens in need while communicating that a Reagan administration would provide a way 
to escape government dependence.   
     To be sure, the predominantly white crowd with “anti-Washington views popular in such 
parts” responded enthusiastically when Reagan also said what he’d said many times in the past: 
states and local communities should handle programs funded by their own taxes.288  He had used 
virtually the exact same language when accepting the Republican nomination in Detroit.289  But 
the most famous line from his speech—“I believe in state’s rights”—received no audible reaction 
on the only known recording of the event.290  This polite attention was not like the roar of protest 
easily detected when Reagan observed the audience was “ninety percent Democrat.” 291 It could 
not touch the whoops of pride that filled the air when Reagan talked about the young athletes 
he’d watched on August 2: the American swimmers he saw break the winning times of athletes 	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in Moscow even though they had been asked to stand by their country rather than stand on a 
podium in the Soviet Union.   
     This does not mean that “state’s rights” has not often been associated with racism or the 
struggle to maintain the color line in the South.  The American Civil War was in part fought over 
“state’s rights” per maintaining the institution of slavery.  Many Southern politicians who 
temporarily broke away from the Democratic Party to form the “Dixiecrat” or “State’s Rights 
Party” in 1948 to protest civil rights legislation used this phrase often.292  Surely Southerners in 
the crowd were very familiar with the term and knew all of the various ways by which it had 
been deployed in their region.  D. Jonathan White from the University of Alabama noted “states’ 
rights” more sordid attachments when writing “the term still appears on occasion in political 
speech, in some cases as code language indicating support of discriminatory practices or outright 
racism; as a result, its use is often met with skepticism or suspicion by the public at large.”293  
However, there is still little evidence apart from speculation about “code” that Reagan was trying 
to tap specifically into white racism in Mississippi.  
     Many years later, shortly after Reagan died, African American civil rights leader, former 
member of LBJ’s administration, journalist and historian Roger Wilkins said: 
[Reagan’s] first speech in his campaign in 1980 was in Philadelphia, Mississippi, which 
nobody outside of Mississippi had ever heard of except for one thing and that was that 
three civil rights workers were killed there in 1964. Reagan said then “I’m for states 
rights.” If you say “I’m for states rights in Mississippi,” everybody knows what you’re 
talking about. Some years later he went to Atlanta and he said “Jefferson Davis is a hero 
of mine.” Everybody knows what you’re talking about then, too.294 
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 Few people would dispute that Reagan’s use of the words “state’s rights” had been inartful and 
insensitive, but it is interesting that none of his critics seem to recognize that some white 
Southern culture exists outside the prism of racism.  As Tony Horwitz discovered when 
researching his Pulitzer Prize winning Confederates in the Attic, the memory of the “War 
Between the States” echoes quite differently in the minds of many Americans who still feel a 
strong connection to a defeated past.295  Though he poked a great deal fun of at misplaced Neo-
Confederate sentiments in enclaves of Dixie—a quiet “railing against modernity” that at times 
used nostalgia as justification for “reactionary politics”— Horwitz seemed capable of at least 
conceding that the South presents a complicated tapestry of beliefs not so easy to unravel with 
just one thread.296 This was certainly Robert Penn Warren’s position in Jefferson Davis Gets His 
Citizenship Back.297   
     First appearing as an extended essay for The New Yorker in 1980, Warren’s piece was written 
on the heels of Jimmy Carter referencing the former President of the Confederacy’s history of 
service to the United States on the occasion of restoring his citizenship.298  Senator Mark 
Hatfield of Oregon had first introduced the resolution for restoration, which had passed 
unanimously on a voice vote, so as to give back to Davis “the rights due an outstanding 
American.”299  Perhaps Reagan mentioned a Southern figure as his hero to connect with a 
Southern audience, but in light of the fact that a Democratic President had recently signed very 	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bipartisan legislation honoring this man, Wilkins’ feelings about how everyone “knew” what 
admiring Jefferson Davis “meant” seem a bit unfair.   
     One might also wonder if Reagan was blowing a “dog whistle” in 1980, what did white voters 
“hear” when he spent twice as much time in the hospital speaking with the wounded civil rights 
leader Vernon Jordan than he had spent at the Neshoba Fair?300 How were Southerners who 
surely watched the national news like everyone else supposed to interpret Reagan’s “major 
assault on the allegiance of black voters to the Democratic Party” when he made a fervent pitch 
for blacks to join his crusade in front of the Urban League?301  If he was telegraphing a return to 
the Jim Crow South, why did he say in a highly publicized, major speech that he was “committed 
to the protection and enforcement of civil rights of black Americans?”302  Is it possible Reagan’s 
outreach was sincere and his use of the phrase “state’s rights” to express his federalism, which he 
made no secret was the foundation of his political worldview, was but another example of racial 
insensitivity like his deployment of “welfare queen” or “young buck?” 
     Regardless, the Atlanta Daily World lauded Reagan’s efforts to reach out to blacks in New 
York with only a passing mention of Mississippi.   After his speech to the Urban League was 
finished, some in attendance relayed the candidate was short on details about how he would help 
minorities in particular, but others felt positive about the fact that he was openly courting their 
vote.  Reagan also got respect from many African Americans for choosing to visit a ghetto in the 
Bronx despite the hostile reception he received from local residents. 303  The three-day effort to 
woo blacks finally ended in Chicago where Reagan met with the editors of Jet and Ebony 	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magazines as well as Jesse Jackson.304  Much like the mixed reaction Reagan received from 
different attendees to his Urban League speech, the civil rights activist and head of Operation 
PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) said he felt it was good that Reagan was reaching out 
to black Americans, but he did not feel Reagan had offered many specific solutions for black 
problems.305  Additionally, in front of television crews near where Reagan’s car was waiting 
outside the PUSH headquarters building, Jackson asked ambush style if Reagan was willing to 
renounce the endorsement he had received from the Ku Klux Klan.  Taken aback, the Republican 
candidate said he was unaware of any such endorsement but repudiated it immediately.306  In a 
follow up letter he wrote to Jackson to thank him for meeting with him, he reiterated: “I join you 
in abhorring the actions and rejecting the tenants of the Klan and all other organizations which 
preach racial, religious or ethnic hatred or encourage a climate of terrorism against any other 
group of people.”307  
     Perhaps Jackson’s inquiry on August 5 was prompted by news that Patricia Harris, a Carter 
surrogate, had already implied publically to several thousand black professionals in Dallas—as 
well as members of the AFL-CIO in Los Angeles—that Reagan was sympathetic with the 
KKK’s hateful purposes.  She had addressed both groups in the official capacity of Carter’s 
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secretary of Health and Human Services:  “The KKK said on July 19, ‘The Republican platform 
reads as if it were written by a Klansman.’  The Klan obviously knows their platform.”308   
     Senator John Tower, the chairman of the committee that penned the platform that “Mrs. 
Harris [chose] to so grossly represent,” issued a press release lambasting the secretary’s words as 
“inflammatory racial slurs” intended to shore up the black vote for President Carter.309  He said, 
“I believe the Black community will see through this transparent ploy as a clearly desperate 
appeal by the Carter Administration for the Black vote…. The Klan endorsement would have 
stayed in the gutter where it belongs if Mrs. Harris had not dignified it by her comments.”310 
     With the incumbent in a dead heat in some polls with John Anderson—the third party 
candidate who was eating into his more liberal base—and behind Reagan before the Democratic 
National Convention, Carter could not relinquish even one ballot. 311  The black voting bloc had 
played too pivotal a role in first putting him into the White House, and he needed to shore up that 
support despite minority dissatisfaction with his performance.312 Therefore, playing on the fears 
of blacks nationwide by implying the Republican Party was a haven for racists to keep his base 
in tact became an integral part of his—and the Democratic Party’s—new “Southern strategy.”   
     As a result, the Reagan campaign monitored all of Harris’s “non-political” speeches.  On one 
transcript preserved with other campaign papers, Dick Wirthlin wrote to Tony Dolan: “Take a 	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good look at this tripe.”  Dolan wrote a memo to Meese saying that both he and Lyn Nofziger 
felt it was “essential” to respond to “this incredible smear” taxpayers had funded, but Harris was 
not the only attack dog the Carter campaign had unleashed.313  Andrew Young, Carter’s former 
ambassador to the United Nations, picked up the fear-mongering ball on August 11, 1980 in an 
editorial published in the Washington Post.  Recalling the sordid history of Philadelphia, 
Mississippi, he lambasted Reagan’s use of the phrase “state’s rights” as “code words” from the 
“southern strategy” script used by Wallace, Goldwater and Nixon.  He used the rhetorical 
question to great effect whilst coupling the Neshoba visit to the Klan endorsement written in a 
Klan newspaper that Patricia Harris had already pushed into the public sphere:   
Is Reagan saying that he intends to do everything he can to turn the clock back to the 
Mississippi of 1964?  Do the powers of state and local governments include the right to 
end the voting rights of black citizens?  Would Reagan dare to commission, directly or 
indirectly, the Sheriff Rainey and the vigilantes to ride once again, poisoning the political 
process with hatred and violence? ...All of this prompts me to pose this question to the 
Urban League’s John Jacobs: do you really believe the black vote is up for grabs this 
year?314 
 
If Reagan had made subliminal appeals to racism, Young used a brutal Southern history to make 
direct appeals to black fears rooted in the past.  In radio commercials that ran on WWRL in New 
York, a station with a predominantly black audience, Young also said, “I would like to talk to 
you a moment about Jimmy Carter, a president who has been our good friend, and about the 
forces that are out to get him and us.”315  Perhaps this is what Harris meant when she said she 
saw “the specter of white sheets” behind Ronald Reagan. 316   Amazingly, these overtures would 
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get more blatant, but first Reagan would make his own stumbling reference to the Klan that 
would hurt, not help, his campaign.   
     Per the Washington Post the candidates’ Labor Day speeches marked the start of the 
presidential race.317 Reagan gave his speech at Liberty State Park with shirtsleeves rolled up and 
the Statue of Liberty standing tall in the background.  Jimmy Carter gave his speech at a picnic 
in Tuscumbia, Alabama, which the Los Angeles Times had reported was “the national 
headquarters of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.”318  Whilst Ronald Reagan had been accused 
of echoing George Wallace rhetoric in Mississippi, the Democratic president embraced George 
Wallace himself where he sat in his wheelchair on the dais from which Carter would give his 
speech.  When the Klan showed up to hear what the president had to say—as uninvited in his 
campaign as they were in Reagan’s—he said it angered him to see them using the Confederate 
battle flag.  This implies he felt the Confederate battle flag might mean something to his white 
Southern constituents other than what it meant to the Klan.  (It is unclear what he may have 
thought such a symbol meant to any Southern blacks in the audience.)  Carter again wrapped 
himself in the South after returning to the White House where he served labor leaders barbecue, 
a regional delicacy.  
     Yet Reagan still managed to get bogged down in what some Alabamians felt was a slur on 
their very honor.  At the Michigan State Fair in Detroit, he “tripped over his own tongue” when 
he said Carter was opening his campaign “in the city that gave birth to” the Ku Klux Klan.319 
Not only did this prompt an indignant telegram from Fob James, the governor of Alabama, the 
campaign was flooded with calls from outraged Southerners.320 A “man from Virginia called to 	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ask that Ronald Reagan stick to bread and butter issues and not the KKK.”321 Many angry voters 
called from Alabama.  The Klan was born in Tennessee.  Helen Keller was born in Tuscumbia!  
(Clearly, many voters in the South no longer wanted to be associated with a segregationist past.)  
An internal campaign memo to Ed Meese from Ed Gray said, “We could lose the whole South 
with [Reagan’s] statement.”322  The Gipper apologized in Detroit saying that he “intended no 
inference that Mr. Carter was in any way sympathetic to the Klan and in no way did I intend to 
disparage the City of Tuscumbia or the State of Alabama.  Nor do I believe there is any place for 
the Klan in the hearts of the people of the South.”323  He also called for President Carter to 
“disavow” statements made by Patricia Harris and Andrew Young that associated his campaign 
with the KKK.   
     This did not fit with the Carter’s campaign plans.  On September 4, 1980, the Atlanta 
Constitution reported that Andrew Young and Coretta Scott King had joined a task force led by 
Maryland Representative Parren Mitchell to generate higher black turnout in the presidential 
election.  Perhaps finding fear to be a good motivator for voters, Mitchell said, “Ronald Reagan 
is a clear and present danger to black America.  He has been embraced and endorsed by the Ku 
Klux Klan.” 324   At Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, President Carter bowed his 
head in front of a black audience in a moment of feigned piety before heavily insinuating 
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Governor Reagan was a hatemongering racist.325  He said, “You’ve seen in this campaign the 
stirrings of hate and the rebirth of code words like ‘state’s rights’ in a speech in Mississippi, in a 
campaign reference to the Ku Klux Klan relating to the South.  This is a message that creates a 
cloud on the political horizon.  Hatred has no place in this country.”326 
     This prompted Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada to issue a statement at a news conference 
accusing Carter of having “resorted to smears and personal attacks against almost all of his major 
opponents since 1966” rather than sticking with a debate on the record.327  Carter relented and 
stopped running an ad that had appeared in “about 100 black oriented newspapers across the 
country starting September 13 and [was] in [September] editions of Ebony” accusing 
Republicans of being “out to beat” Carter because of the number of black judges he had 
appointed.328  Richard Nixon weighed in on the state of the political season when he told Teddy 
White for the Today show that “They’re a tough bunch… these Georgia boys.  They may play 
softball down in Plains, but they play hardball in the country.”329  Senator Laxalt called Carter’s 
style “hardball below the belt.”330   
     Reflecting on Carter in the Presidential Studies Quarterly, communications and culture 
professor Dan F. Hahn claimed the president’s rhetorical characteristics were marked by a 
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reputation of “inflexibility and meanness.”331  For evidence, Hahn pointed to articles written 
about the president’s style during the 1980 campaign.  The New York Post called Carter’s attacks 
on Reagan as “‘savage’, the ‘politics of extremism,’ going ‘for the jugular,’ ‘fighting dirty,’ with 
a ‘crude attempt to smear’ by a ‘compulsively nasty little campaigner’ who ‘has an attraction 
to… groins and eyeballs.’”332  The New York Times, which had endorsed him, observed Carter 
did not seem to know “there is a difference between hard blows and low ones,” and the Daily 
News called Carter’s tactics a “disgrace to the Presidency and a disservice to the country.”333  
These reactions were in part inspired by statements like those Carter gave to attendees of a 
fundraising cocktail party in Chicago on October 6: “You’ll determine whether or not this 
America will be unified or, if I lose the elections, whether Americans might be separated, black 
from white, Jew from Christian, North from South, rural from urban…”334 
     Some people in the minority community did not believe Carter’s message. Ralph Abernathy 
denounced Carter for not improving conditions for the poor.335  Further recognizing the 
debilitating impact of out of control inflation on black families, the civil rights leader “urged 
blacks to flock to the polls en masse for Reagan because ‘we need a change and we need it 
now.’”336 Hosea Williams followed suit.337  Revealing his conservative worldview, Walter E. 
Williams wrote in the Atlanta Daily World that attacks on Reagan made him think about how 
“fairness” can be twisted to an ends-justify-the-means scenario in which the rights to self-	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government, individual freedom, and a chance to participate in the free market are held in 
contempt: “Attempts by the government to eliminate ‘unfairness’ itself produce tyranny and 
ultimate decline.”338   
     This was around the time that Andrew Young made the remarks even the White House had to 
repudiate: “state’s rights… looks like a code word to me that it’s going to be all right to kill 
niggers when [Reagan’s] president.”339  But Walter Mondale was not corrected when he told 
voters in Texas that Reagan was “an enemy of Mexican-Americans and blacks.”340  (Though 
Young was no longer working as Carter’s appointed Ambassador to the UN, Mondale was not a 
low level cabinet surrogate but the Vice President of the United States.)  Additionally, after 
Reagan received an endorsement from Charles Evers, Medgar Evers’ brother, the Los Angeles 
Times reported renowned civil rights leader Clarence Mitchell called Reagan a racist at a news 
conference held with feminist Gloria Steinem (who wasn’t very fond of Reagan either.)341 
     Memory is selective and many feel today that everyone knew what would happen on Election 
Day in 1980.  The night before the election, Reagan paid the networks for thirty minutes of time 
to make his last, great pitch.  Jimmy Carter was but a footnote in the speech.  His vision was one 
of a renewed America, mankind’s “last best hope.”  Keeping to his federalist underpinnings, he 
called the country a “federation of sovereign states.”  He reminded his audience that when John 
Wayne died, and the newspapers had called him the “last American hero,” nothing could have 
been further from the truth. There were men that he had entertained himself who had been 
prisoners of war in Vietnam.  They were heroes, too: “the product of the freest society the world 
has ever known.”  Reagan said, “It is humility before God that is ultimately the strength of a 	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nation.”  Americans needed to “act worthy of themselves, bind the nation’s wounds, and protect 
that shining city on a hill.”342  The next day when Reagan emerged from the voting booth and 
was asked for whom he had voted, he said, “Nancy.”343  
     When all was said and done, the South was not exceptional in choosing for her new leader 
Ronald Reagan.  He had broken the Democratic coalition in a landslide with a conservative 
vision.  Andrew Young destined to become the mayor of Atlanta spoke at Brown University 
before Reagan had taken the oath of office and indicated his hopes that the new man in charge 
would not make Americans “suffer too much.”344  Perhaps it is fair to say that the majority of 
voters did not feel as if they had suffered.  In 1984, the margins that put Ronald Reagan back in 
office would be even more resounding, one of the greatest landslide victories in American 
history.345     
     
CONCLUSION 
     The construction of the “racist Republican” is partially the result of a cleavage in ideology 
between Republicans and minorities, perception of intent, and ongoing political strategy that 
exists in American politics.  When	  activists	  like	  Tim	  Wise	  propose	  racism	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  “both	  an	  idea	  and	  a	  structure	  of	  institutions	  in	  which	  policies,	  practices	  and	  procedures	  produce	  inequitable	  outcomes,”	  conservatives	  are	  baffled	  because	  they	  feel	  “inequitable	  outcomes”	  are	  inevitable	  in	  a	  just	  society.346	  	  In	  Dog	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Appeals	  Have	  Reinvented	  Racism	  and	  Wrecked	  the	  Middle	  Class,	  Ian	  Haney-­‐Lopez	  verbalized	  a	  common	  belief	  on	  the	  Left:	  “Reagan,	  conservatism	  and	  racial	  resentment	  were	  inextricably	  fused,”	  which	  forever	  attaches	  an	  element	  of	  racist	  taint	  to	  conservative	  positions.347	  	  This coincides with the normative narrative of the Left, which can be quickly 
summarized as, “ever since Goldwater and Nixon concocted the benighted, openly racist 
‘Southern Strategy’ in the ‘60s, the Republican Party has profited from overt and covert 
racism.”348 However, the relationship between the GOP and minorities is much more complex 
and has unfolded over many decades.   
     Per quick review, following	  the	  Civil	  War,	  African	  Americans	  voted	  predominantly	  for	  the	  Party	  of	  Lincoln	  for	  obvious	  reasons.	  	  This	  remained	  the	  case	  well	  into	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  However,	  FDR	  took	  steps	  in	  the	  1930s	  to	  ameliorate	  racial	  injustices	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  which	  ultimately	  engendered	  the	  first	  significant	  African	  American	  support	  for	  Democrats.349	  	  Harry	  Truman	  further	  “recognized	  the	  path	  to	  winning	  another	  term	  was	  through	  securing	  the	  votes	  of	  a	  burgeoning	  black	  electorate,”	  and	  he	  made	  a	  sincere	  effort	  after	  World	  War	  II	  to	  advance	  civil	  rights,	  which	  effectively	  split	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  the	  South	  in	  1948.350	  	  In	  1952,	  the	  Deep	  South	  returned	  home	  to	  the	  Democratic	  Party,	  but	  Republicans	  started	  to	  make	  inroads	  in	  middle	  to	  upper	  class	  districts	  as	  Southerners	  had	  economic	  reasons	  to	  rethink	  their	  party	  allegiances.	  	  Even	  so,	  in	  1956,	  two-­‐term	  President	  Eisenhower	  who	  took	  several	  important	  steps	  towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Ian Haney-Lopez, “The Racism at the Heart of the Reagan Presidency,” Salon, January 11, 2014, ccessed April 8, 
2014 http://www.salon.com/2014/01/11/the_racism_at_the_heart_of_the_reagan_presidency/  Describing the 
electoral victories of Nixon and Reagan and “that of the other conservative dog whistlers” as good examples of how 
Southern voters have allowed “racial entreaties to bamboozle them into voting for an anti-New Deal candidate,” 
Haney-Lopez has dismissed the ability of an entire region of people to discern what is in their best interest.	  	   
348 Ron Rosenbaum, “Is the Republican Party Racist?” Slate, October 8, 2012.    
349 David Woolner, “African Americans and the New Deal: A Look Back in History,” Roosevelt Institute, Accessed 
April 28, 2013, http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/new-roosevelt/african-americans-and-new-deal-look-back-history 
350 Seth C. McKee, “The Past, Present, and Future of Southern Politics,” Southern Culture (September 1, 2012), 95.  
Strom Thurmond led the Dixiecrat Party in 1948, which took Deep South states away from Truman.   
	   91	  
ensuring	  the	  equal	  enjoyment	  of	  civil	  liberties	  by	  all	  citizens,	  pulled	  the	  highest	  percentage	  of	  African	  American	  votes	  for	  a	  Republican	  since	  before	  the	  New	  Deal.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  gains	  would	  be	  lost	  when	  Senator	  John	  Kennedy	  from	  Massachusetts	  picked	  up	  a	  telephone	  during	  the	  1960	  election	  and	  called	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.’s	  wife	  to	  express	  sympathy	  and	  offer	  help	  for	  her	  husband	  who	  had	  been	  arrested	  in	  Atlanta,	  Georgia	  for	  activism.351	  	  Despite	  having	  opposed	  voting	  on	  the	  1957	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  which	  Nixon	  had	  supported,	  JFK	  thereby	  won	  the	  crucial	  endorsement	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Sr.	  and	  68%	  of	  the	  African	  American	  vote.	  352	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Even	  so,	  once	  in	  office,	  Kennedy	  did	  little	  to	  further	  civil	  rights	  until	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  racial	  inequality	  were	  highlighted	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	  activists—and	  the	  horrifying	  and	  televised	  violence	  against	  blacks	  that	  was	  openly	  displayed	  in	  Birmingham,	  Alabama—that	  they	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  compartmentalized	  in	  one	  region	  of	  the	  country.353	  	  	  The	  fate	  of	  proposed	  legislation	  was	  uncertain,	  but	  after	  Kennedy’s	  death,	  Lyndon	  Baines	  Johnson	  “seized	  on	  the	  [1964]	  civil	  rights	  bill	  as	  the	  perfect	  instrument	  for	  establishing	  his	  credentials	  with	  northern	  and	  western	  liberals,”	  and	  brought	  much	  needed	  relief	  to	  African	  Americans	  who	  had	  long	  been	  denied	  their	  equal	  rights.354	  Republicans	  like	  Senator	  Everett	  Dirksen	  were	  LBJ’s	  essential	  partners,	  but	  Republican	  Senator	  Barry	  Goldwater’s	  vote	  against	  the	  bill	  paralleled	  that	  of	  the	  segregationist	  Democrats.	  	  Paying	  with	  his	  party’s	  image,	  the	  Arizonan	  gained	  the	  votes	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 David A. Bostis, “Blacks and the 2000 Democratic National Convention,” Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies, (Washington D.C.: 2000), 9.  He pulled 39% of the black vote. 
352 “Civil Rights Movement,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Accessed April 28, 2013, 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx 
353 Daniel Stevens, “Public Opinion and Public Policy: The Case of Kennedy and Civil Rights,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 32, No. 1 (Mar, 2002): 111 
354 Robert D. Loevy, “A Brief History of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” Accessed April 28, 2013, 
http://faculty1.coloradocollege.edu/~bloevy/CivilRightsActOf1964/	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five	  Deep	  South	  states	  during	  his	  1964	  bid	  for	  president,	  but	  President	  Johnson	  retained	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  South’s	  loyalty	  and	  garnered	  94%	  of	  the	  African	  American	  vote.355	  	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  blacks	  and	  Republicans	  would	  remain	  strained	  from	  that	  point 
forward.  Some have said Reagan’s terms in office all but severed it.356   
     This was in part because the Reagan administration “recast civil rights to a degree not seen 
since Lyndon Johnson.”357  Harkening back to the ideological foundations of Barry Goldwater, 
which promoted federalism, and expressing the belief that the country’s culture on race had 
changed since 1964, Reagan pushed to lessen the federal government’s role in all American life 
including aspects concerned with civil rights.  In fact, from his first inaugural address in which 
he laid out his philosophical vision, he attempted to shift the national conversation to a more 
universalist approach to governing with less emphasis on special interests.  He contended “this 
administration’s objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that provides equal 
opportunities for all Americans, with no barriers born of bigotry or discrimination.”358	  	  This	  coincided	  with	  a	  conservative	  interpretation	  of	  fairness,	  which	  demands	  a	  society	  in	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 David A. Bostis, “Blacks and the 2000 Democratic National Convention,” Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies, (Washington D.C.: 2000), 9. 
356 Sam Tanenhaus, “Original Sin: Why the GOP Is and Will Continue to be the Party of White People,” The New 
Republic, February 10, 2013.  Republicans have tied themselves to a peculiar logic of nullification pervasive in a 
backwards-looking South, which gave rise to conservative leaders like Ronald Reagan who “had a history of 
sympathy for Southern nullifiers” and who would inevitably cancel out all credibility on civil rights the Republicans 
may have once had with the African American community. 
Robert Cohen and Pedro A. Noguera, “Remembering Reagan’s Record on Civil Rights and the South African 
Freedom Struggle,” The Nation (Feb. 11, 2011).  Accessed March 10, 2013, 
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  Steven A. Shull, A Kinder, Gentler Racism? The Reagan-Bush Civil Rights Legacy (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 
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358 Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1981, The American Presidency Project, accessed April 10 
2014, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130  Recalling his strong belief in states’ rights, he also said, “All 
of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal 
Government.”	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there	  is	  as	  even	  a	  playing	  field	  as	  possible	  but	  no	  fixed	  results.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  Reagan’s	  policies	  often	  ran	  counter	  to	  perceived	  minority	  interests.	  	   
     Additionally, when speaking in 2013 about the Republican Party’s tortured relationship with 
minorities, conservative economist Thomas Sowell observed the GOP had made many mistakes 
“all the way back to Ronald Reagan, whom [Sowell regarded] as the greatest president in the 
twentieth century, but whose approach to, uh, minorities was very, very poor.”359 In Sowell’s 
opinion, one problem was Reagan’s style over his substance: a general lack of understanding on 
the Great Communicator’s part when it came to getting his message across to people of color.  
After all, George Wallace who had clearly been a segregationist for much of his career—who 
had quite literally stood in the schoolhouse door to stop black advancement—was able to win 
over an amazing number of black voters in his twilight years in politics.360 On the other hand, 
Reagan, who had never been a segregationist and who had done a great deal of good for minority 
communities, has remained vilified.   
     Additionally, Reagan made several decisions while in office that were especially ill received 
by blacks.  Some of these decisions, like attempting to limit or end affirmative action, dealt 
directly with executing the office of president per a conservative worldview that called for more 
limited government.  But Reagan’s choice to oppose legislation creating a federal holiday 
commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr. seemed unfathomable to blacks and whites alike.  First 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Thomas Sowell interview by John Bachman, “Thomas Sowell to Newsmax: GOP Outreach to Blacks 
Unpromising,” Newsmax TV, March 22, 2013, accessed March 22, 2014, 
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/sowell-gop-blacks-unpromising/2013/03/22/id/495990/ Sowell has posited 
one problem was while Wallace would go to black churches to ask for forgiveness and a second chance in his home 
state, Reagan went to the Urban League to make his case.  This sent the message that he thought “the black 
establishment [could] provide entrée into the black public, as if the establishment [owned] the rest of black people.” 
This positioning was resented in 1980 and is still resented today.  It is also a nonsensical approach when looking for 
conservatively minded blacks.  Reagan—and Republicans in general—did not—do not—understand how to position 
the GOP to appeal to minorities. 
360 Colman McCarthy, “George Wallace – From the Heart,” March 17, 1995, Washington Post, accessed April 6, 
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/sept98/wallace031795.htm  In Wallace’s last race for 
governor, he won  “well over 90 percent of the black vote.” 
	   94	  
voted down in Congress in 1979, many felt opposition to this special remembrance was due 
solely to racism.361  Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina was especially truculent.  When 
Reagan was asked if he felt King had been a communist sympathizer per Helms’s charges on the 
Senate floor, Reagan snapped, “We’ll know in about thirty-five years, won’t we?”362   
     The impression Reagan must have given blacks at that time might have been softened if he 
had not made an inflammatory snap-statement to a reporter but instead made a better case for his 
position.  He did not support an MLK Day as a federal holiday, but this is not because he did not 
want to honor the slain civil rights leader.  Rather, he would have preferred to use the money he 
knew it would cost to give federal employees a day off for something more impactful for the 
black community such as funding mass scholarships.363  This is in line with a major campaign 
promise he made—and kept through Executive Order 12320—directly to the black community to 
open the door to increased federal spending for black colleges, which targeted the African 
Americans in a way that coincided with a conservative mindset that stressed promoting 
individual empowerment.364  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Frances Romero, “A Brief History of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day,” Time, January 18, 2010.  
362 Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History: 1974-2008 (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 183.	  	  
363 Ronald Reagan, Reagan: In His Own Hand, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson 
(New York: The Free Press, 2001), 385.  Reagan wrote and delivered a radio address on November 29, 1977 about 
MLK Day in conjunction with Michigan’s decision to adopt a new state holiday.  He admired a proposal of Jack 
Welborn, a Republican state senator, who had said it made little sense to give middle class government workers the 
day off—partially at the expense of low-income workers—when the money involved could have launched 
scholarships for disadvantaged students in MLK’s name in addition to creating a center for studying non-violent 
protest movements.  “One Senator Jack Welborn stood alone in opposition to the plan.  It took courage because 
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364 Ronald Reagan, “Statement of Governor Reagan on Black College Day,” September 23, 1980, Box 306, 
Citizens’ Operations (Max Hugel): Voter Groups’ Administrative Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 121.  “I want to 
personally join with just about every social, political, church and civic organization in the Black community in 
support of our country’s 107 historically Black colleges.”   
Tony Brown, “Black College Struggle: Court Rulings Ignored,” July 2, 1980, The News World, Box 306, Citizens’ 
Operations (Max Hugel): Voter Groups’ Administrative Files, Ronald Reagan Library.  Black colleges were getting 
less money under the Carter administration due to desegregation efforts—however unintended--that actually hurt 
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     Finally, there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  politicians	  of	  every	  stripe	  have	  used	  “conquer	  and	  divide”	  approaches	  to	  winning	  elections	  going	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Republic.	  	  Republicans	  have	  also	  united	  at	  times	  with	  segregationists	  even	  when	  not	  embracing	  their	  causes.	  	  However, reducing Southerners’ political concerns to race issues in every national 
election since 1964 belies decades of economic and social progress.  It is to persist the South has 
remained the region H. L. Mencken once described as a “bunghole of the United States, a 
cesspool of Baptists, a miasma of Methodism, snake charmers, phony real estate dealers, and 
syphilitic evangelists” focused predominantly on maintaining a rigid, racial order.365  It is to hold 
white Southerners forever in contempt for the sins of their fathers.  Yet	  this	  belief	  is	  necessary	  to	  accept	  the	  thrust	  of	  Republican	  politics	  today	  involves	  “dog	  whistles.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  After	  the	  election	  of	  the	  country’s	  first	  black	  president,	  many	  Americans	  hoped	  politics	  would	  move	  beyond	  such	  beliefs	  and	  into	  a	  post-­‐racial	  society.	  	  However,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  the	  result	  of	  President	  Obama’s	  tenure	  in	  office.	  	  Many	  on	  the	  Left	  have	  contended	  
Republicans have attacked the commander-in-chief because of racism.366 Even General Colin 
Powell, a former secretary of state who served his country in multiple Republican cabinets 
including Ronald Reagan’s said in an interview on NBC’s Meet the Press, “There’s also a 
dark… vein of intolerance in some parts of the [Republican] Party…. [Republicans] still sort of 
look down on minorities.”367  A GOP insider, Powell’s opinions cannot be construed as purely 
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American Presidency Project, accessed April 10 2014, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43130  	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366 Joe Conason, “Conservative Racists Return,” Real Clear Politics, August 12, 2010.  “As if suffering from a facial 
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partisan. Yet many on the Right have contended Democrats use race predominantly to stir up 
their base and keep a strategic voting block in line.368  Speaking of political dissent from the 
majority of blacks, Clarence	  Thomas,	  a	  sitting	  Supreme	  Court	  justice,	  told	  an	  audience	  at	  Duquesne	  Law	  School	  in	  2013,	  “Any	  black	  person	  who	  says	  something	  that	  is	  not	  the	  prescribed	  things	  they	  expect	  from	  a	  black	  person	  will	  be	  picked	  apart.	  	  You	  can	  pick	  anybody—don’t	  pick	  me—pick	  anyone	  who	  has	  decided	  not	  to	  go	  along	  with	  it;	  there’s	  a	  price	  to	  pay.”369	  	  Truly,	  there	  are	  countless	  examples	  of	  there	  being	  substance	  to	  this	  charge	  as	  even	  blacks	  not	  heavily	  engaged	  in	  politics	  are	  publically	  excoriated	  for	  leaning	  right.370	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  lines	  of	  what	  racism—or	  pandering	  to	  racists—even	  is	  continue	  to	  be	  blurred	  when	  drawn	  onto	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  	  Consider	  analysis	  of	  President	  Obama’s	  policies	  directed	  towards	  the	  African	  American	  community	  during	  his	  first	  term.	  	  In	  2010	  Tavis	  Smiley,	  a	  liberal	  political	  commentator,	  told	  civil	  rights	  activist	  Tim	  Wise:	  “When	  the	  president	  is	  asked	  specifically…	  about	  black	  unemployment	  his	  answer,	  you	  know,	  famously	  or	  infamously,	  is	  a	  rising	  tide	  will	  lift	  all	  boats.	  	  The	  same	  answer,	  by	  the	  way,	  that	  Ronald	  Reagan	  gave:	  that	  a	  rising	  tide	  will	  lift	  all	  boats.…	  You	  ask	  him	  about	  anything	  specific	  no	  matter	  how	  far	  and	  how	  wide	  the	  gap	  is	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between	  black	  and	  white,	  his	  answer	  is	  that	  a	  universal	  approach	  will	  benefit	  everybody.”	  371	  	  	  Wise	  responded	  that	  President	  Obama	  often	  pandered	  to	  white	  voters,	  which	  effectively	  reduced	  the	  first	  black	  president	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  using	  the	  “Southern	  Strategy”	  of	  Kevin	  Phillips.	  	  Rather than pushing race onto a metaphorical back burner where it can be 
forgotten, these sorts of interpretations mix all motivations for political actions into a stew that 
will be forever distilled into just one dish: racism.  Though one might contend as Ebony 
magazine has observed that President	  Obama	  has	  “energetically	  courted	  Latinos	  and	  LGBT	  groups—with	  solid	  policy	  results—while	  rarely	  explicitly	  addressing	  Black-­‐specific	  concerns,”	  this	  is	  not	  good	  evidence	  of	  a	  strategy	  that	  uses	  racial	  antipathies	  to	  appeal	  to	  whites.372	  	  But	  it	  does	  call	  into	  question	  why	  blacks	  remain	  so	  devoted	  to	  a	  Democratic	  Party	  that	  often	  takes	  them	  for	  granted.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  answer	  might	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  politics	  is	  a	  shifting	  miasma	  of	  vision,	  persuasive	  appeals,	  and	  outright	  pandering.	  	  As	  Barack	  Obama	  has	  explained,	  the	  Left	  and	  the	  Right	  spin	  tales	  “not	  to	  persuade	  the	  other	  side	  but	  to	  keep	  their	  bases	  agitated	  and	  assured	  of	  the	  rightness	  of	  their	  respective	  causes—and	  lure	  just	  enough	  new	  adherents	  to	  beat	  the	  other	  side	  into	  submission.”373	  	  Indeed,	  to	  his	  point,	  there	  have	  been	  times	  in	  the	  history	  in	  which	  both	  Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  have	  courted	  voters	  disgruntled	  about	  racial	  issues	  to	  forward	  political	  agendas.	  	  Half	  a	  century	  ago,	  though	  he	  was	  not	  a	  racist,	  Barry	  Goldwater’s	  “Southern	  strategy”	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  the	  rift	  that	  still	  exists	  between	  the	  GOP	  and	  black	  voters	  because	  it	  aligned	  his	  campaign	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Tavis Smiley, The Tavis Smiley Show, PBS, June 28, 2010 
372 Steven Gray, “Out in the Cold,” Ebony, March 2013, 32.  “It’s hard to forget the September 2011 night when the 
president told CBC [Congressional Black Caucus] annual dinner attendees to ‘stop complaining.’” 
373 Obama, Barack.  The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American  
Dream, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 37.   
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segregationists.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  South’s	  racial	  attitudes	  were	  more	  comfortably	  integrated	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  sincere	  clashes	  in	  ideologies—and	  some	  inept	  positioning	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan—did	  not	  heal	  that	  rift.	  	  	  Surely	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  “Southern	  strategy”	  poured	  salt	  into	  an	  historic	  wound.	  	  Yet	  when	  a	  sitting	  president	  and	  his	  attorney	  general	  choose	  to	  spark	  racially	  charged	  exchanges	  around	  the	  fifty-­‐year	  anniversary	  of	  the	  bipartisan	  1964	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  they	  have	  best	  demonstrated	  why	  the	  construct	  of	  the	  “racist	  Republican”	  has	  remained	  so	  pervasive	  in	  what	  many	  would	  have	  hoped	  was	  a	  new	  age	  in	  American	  race	  relations.374	  	  It	  is	  a	  useful	  and	  distracting	  tool	  from	  which	  Democrats	  still	  gain	  benefit.	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